Productivity, markups, and trade liberalization: evidence from Mexican manufacturing industries by Puggioni, Daniela
Universita` degli Studi di Cagliari
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN ECONOMIA
XXIV Ciclo
Productivity, Markups, and Trade Liberalization:
Evidence from Mexican Manufacturing Industries
Settore scientifico-disciplinare di afferenza SECS-P/06
Dottoranda: Daniela Puggioni
Coordinatore Dottorato: Prof. Romano Piras
Tutor/Relatore: Prof. Fabiano Schivardi
Esame finale anno accademico 2011-2012
Productivity, Markups, and Trade Liberalization:
Evidence from Mexican Manufacturing Industries∗
Daniela Puggioni†
Abstract
In order to evaluate the effects of any policy or answer economic relevant questions
it is of primary importance to accurately quantify the variables and the parameters
that may be involved with the policy or the questions. Since production functions
are a fundamental components of all economics, in most of the cases answering those
questions requires to estimate production function parameters. Nonetheless, produc-
tion function estimation is challenging since optimal input choices are correlated with
firm-specific unobserved productivity shocks. In this contribution I apply a structural
framework for estimating production function coefficients explicitly controlling for pro-
ductivity through an observable proxy (investment or intermediate inputs) using a rich
panel dataset of Mexican manufacturing firms between 1984 and 1990. I further derive
firm-level markup estimates and use these estimates to evaluate the impact of the dra-
matic trade liberalization that took place in Mexico during the sample period on the
profitability of domestic firms and exporters. My findings emphasize the importance of
obtaining consistent estimates in order to correctly assess differences in technologies,
productivity, and market power among the Mexican firms.
Settore Scientifico-Disciplinare: SECS-P/06.
JEL Classification: D22, D24, F14, L11, L60.
Keywords: Production function estimation, productivity, markups, trade liberaliza-
tion, Mexican manufacturing industries.
∗Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Professor James Tybout for providing me with the data and
valuable suggestions for this project. I also thank Professor Bee-Yan Roberts and Professor Paul Grieco
for thoughtful remarks. A special thanks goes to Professor Spiro Stefanou for his support and to Professor
Fabiano Schivardi for his guidance. Furthermore, I am particularly grateful to Professor Stefano Usai
and Professor Emanuela Marrocu for encouragement and valuable comments, and to Alexandros Fakos for
helpful discussions and very useful computational tips.
†Universita` di Cagliari and The Pennsylvania State University, puggioni.daniela@gmail.com
1
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 Literature Overview on Production Functions Estimation 7
2.1 Basic endogeneity issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Traditional solutions: instrumental variables and fixed effects . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Instrumental variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Structural solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 The Olley and Pakes approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 The Levinson and Petrin approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 The Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Alternative solutions: dynamic panel models and endogenous productivity . 26
2.4.1 Dynamic panel data methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.2 Estimating endogenous productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Concluding remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Empirical Methodology 33
3.1 A structural framework to estimate production function coefficients . . . . . 33
3.1.1 The empirical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.2 Estimation procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 A structural approach to derive firm-level markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 A simpler dual approach to derive industry-level markups . . . . . . . . . . 40
4 Trade Exposure and Price-Cost Margins 43
4.1 The Mexican case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Relating markups and measures of trade liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Relating markups and export status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5 Data 48
5.1 Data preparation: relevant variables and sample selection criteria . . . . . . 48
5.2 Sample characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3 Trade statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2
6 Production Function Estimation Results 56
6.1 Production function parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.1 Comparing different estimators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.1.2 Testing for a structural change in the production function parameters 59
6.2 Productivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.3 Robustness checks with alternative models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7 Price-Cost Margins Results 69
7.1 Industry-level Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.2 Plant-level Markups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.3 Markups and Trade Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3.1 Industry-Level Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3.2 Plant-Level Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.4 Markups for exporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8 Conclusions 85
3
1 Introduction
In order to evaluate the effects of any policy or answer economic relevant questions it is of
primary importance to accurately quantify the variables and the parameters that may be
involved with the policy or the questions. Since production functions are a fundamental
component of all economics, oftentimes it is hard even to formulate a question appropriately
without considering production functions and embedding them in the framework. This is
because much of economic theory provides testable implications that are directly related
to technology and optimizing behavior. Production functions relate productive inputs to
outputs and applied economists started to worry since the early 1940s about the issues
confronting their estimation because of the potential correlation between optimal input
choices and unobserved firm-specific determinants of production. The rationale behind
this concern is intuitive. Firms that experience higher productivity shocks are likely to
respond increasing their input usage, therefore classical estimation methods as, for example,
ordinary least squares (OLS) will yield biased coefficient estimates and biased estimates
of productivity. Consequently, any further analysis or evaluation based on those biased
estimates will be necessarily unreliable.
In the literature many alternatives to OLS have been proposed, from relatively sim-
ple instrumental variables and fixed effects solutions to more complex and sophisticated
techniques like dynamic panel data estimators and structural empirical models. In this
contribution I rely on the original insight of Olley and Pakes (1996) and the successive
extension by Levinson and Petrin (2003) and attempt to correctly estimate production
function parameters and productivity with a structural procedure using an observable
proxy, either investment or intermediate inputs, to control for the correlation between in-
put levels and the unobserved productivity shock. The essential assumption for successfully
applying this methodology is that productivity and investment (or intermediate inputs) are
linked through a unique monotonic relation so that observed investment (or intermediate
inputs) choices contain valuable information about the productivity shock and can be used
to consistently estimate production function coefficients. I take this empirical framework
to a rich panel dataset including information on production and trade characteristics for
over 2,000 Mexican manufacturing firms between 1984 and 1990.
With the unbiased production function estimates in hand, I further derive firm-level
price-cost margins relying on a structural approach in which markups are given by the
wedge between the cost share of factors of production and their revenue share. This
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approach has the advantage of being very general and flexible as it does not impose any
strong restrictions on the underlying production function and it does not require to specify
how firms compete in the market. I then compare these plant-level markup estimates
with industry-level markups obtained through a simpler dual approach in order to verify
the extent to which using micro-level information and directly controlling for unobserved
firm-level productivity is important in correctly evaluating market power.
During the period covered in the data the Mexican economy tried to find its way out
of a deep recession undergoing major structural reforms such as reduction in government
expenditure, privatization of state-owned companies, elimination of subsidies, deregulation
of financial markets, liberalization of foreign investment, and a dramatic re-orientation of
trade policy. The trade policy reforms were perhaps the most striking leading Mexico to
become one of the most open economy in the world in less than a decade. Therefore,
the Mexican economic environment in those years is particularly suitable to analyze the
effects of trade exposure on the Mexican manufacturing firms. More specifically, in order
to investigate whether the outward looking trade reforms lowered the profitability of the
domestic firms by boosting competition, I test the relation between markups and measures
of import liberalization in a regression framework. In addition, I combine the markups
and the productivity estimates to verify the prediction of several recent international trade
models that exporters are more productive and thus able to charge higher markups.
The main findings of my contribution can be summarized as follows. First, controlling
for unobserved productivity with the investment proxy successfully corrects the simultane-
ity bias in the production function parameter estimates. Second, the markups estimated
at the firm level are more reasonable and significantly higher than the ones estimated at
the industry level demonstrating that exploiting micro-level data and taking into account
differences in productivity is important to assess the extent of market power. Third, the
industry-level analysis on the impact of trade liberalization on the profitability of the Mex-
ican manufacturing industries provides some evidence of import discipline but this result
is not confirmed at the plant level. Lastly, the markup premium for exporters is significant
only for ”intensive” exporters, i.e. firms exporting a high percentage of their output.
The reminder of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the main
issues and contributions in the literature regarding production function estimation. Section
3 includes the details of the empirical methodology used to estimate the production function
parameters as well as the markups. Section 4 briefly characterizes the main features of the
Mexican trade liberalization and illustrates some simple models suitable to relate markups
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and trade exposure. The data and the sample selection criteria are described in Section 5.
Sections 6 and 7 present the results on the production function estimation and price-cost
margins analysis, respectively. Section 8 concludes.
6
2 Literature Overview on Production Functions Estimation
2.1 Basic endogeneity issues
Production functions are an essential component in both theoretical and empirical economic
models and their estimation has a long history in applied economics, starting in 1800.
However, researchers are actually interested in estimating production functions because, in
most cases, it is a tool for answering other questions, only partially related to the production
function itself. Oftentimes it is hard even to formulate a question appropriately without
considering production functions and embedding them in the framework. For example, a
researcher may be interested in the presence of economies of scale in production, in whether
productivity differences depend upon differences in the quality of labor or differences in
R&D, in whether the marginal product of factors are equal to factor prices, in what is the
market structure in different industries and how this is related to the profitability of the
firms. All these questions require reliable estimates of cost or production functions and
are so important and interesting in economics that it is worth trying to answer them, even
though the estimation framework used for these purposes may be quite problematic.
Econometric production functions, as we know them today, essentially relate productive
inputs (e.g. capital and labor) to outputs and have their roots in the work of Cobb
and Douglas (1928) who proposed production function estimation as a tool for testing
hypotheses on marginal productivity and competitiveness in labor markets. Criticism to
their approach came very soon as Mendershausen (1938) argued that the data used by
Douglas were too multi-collinear to allow for a credible determination of the production
function coefficients. Marshack and Andrews (1944) were the first to explicitly state one
of the main reasons why production function estimation is problematic.
”Can the economist measure the effect of changing amounts of labor and capital on
the firm’s output - the ”production function” - in the same way in which the agricultural
research worker measures the effect of changing amounts of fertilizers on the plot’s yield?
He cannot because the manpower and capital used by each firm is determined by the firm, not
by the economist. This determination is expressed by a system of functional relationships;
the production function, in which the economist happens to be interested, is but one of
them.”
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To illustrate the issue consider the Cobb-Douglas production function technology
Yj = AjK
βk
j L
βl
j
with one output Yj and two inputs: capital Kj and labor Lj . Aj is the Hicks-neutral
efficiency level of firm j, that is unobservable by the econometrician. Taking natural logs
the previous relation becomes linear
yj = β0 + βkkj + βllj + εj (2.1)
where lowercase letters express natural logarithms of the variables, (e.g. ln(Kj) = kj) and
ln(Aj) = β0+εj . The constant term β0 can be view as the mean efficiency level across firms,
while εj is the deviation from that mean for each firm j. εj represents all other disturbances,
left out the factors, such as firm-specific technology, efficiency, or management differences,
functional form discrepancies, measurement errors in output, or unobserved sources of
variation in output. The observation made by Marshack and Andrews is that, since the
right-hand-side variables are chosen by the firm is some optimal or behavioral fashion, they
cannot really be treated as independent. In fact, if the firm knows its εj , or some part of
it, when making input choices, these choices will likely be correlated with εj . One could
argue that capital can be considered a fixed input, as it is usually predetermined for the
duration of the relevant observation period, and it is therefore orthogonal with respect to
the disturbance term. The same argument, however, will not apply to labor, even if we are
willing to make the quite strong assumption that firms operate in perfectly competitive
input and output markets and treat capital as a fixed input. If firms perfectly or imperfectly
observe εj before choosing the optimal amount of labor to utilize in production, their choice
will necessarily depend on εj and the usual exogeneity assumptions that are required for
unbiasedness and consistency of OLS are unlikely to hold. Empirical results have actually
shown that both capital and labor are usually correlated with the error term but most
often the bias in the labor coefficient is larger than the bias on the capital coefficient. This
is consistent with the view that labor is more easily adjustable than capital, this more
variable, and therefore more highly correlated with j .
Marshack and Andrews introduced a simultaneous equations methodology to produc-
tion function estimation that can be exposed using a simple profit maximizing model of
the joint determination of output and labor, given capital, output price (assuming, for
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simplicity that the price of output is the same across firms and it is normalized to 1) and
input prices. In this context the marginal productivity condition, which is also the variable
input demand function, is given by:
yj = lj + wj − ln(βl) + νj (2.2)
where w is the natural logarithm of the price of labor and νj is a term representing all
the deviations from the assumed conditions of perfect competition, absence of risk aversion
and uncertainty, and possible measurement errors in yj , lj , and wj . Equations (2.1) and
(2.2) constitute a system of two structural equations whose reduced form is given by:
lj =
(
1
1− βl
)
[β0 + ln(βl) + βkkj − (wj + νj) + εj ] (2.3)
yj =
(
1
1− βl
)
[β0 + βl(βo + ln(βl)) + βkkj − βl(wj + νj) + εj ] (2.4)
Thus the simple message of the Marshack and Andrews’ contribution is that if labor is
chosen even approxmately optimally, the production function disturbance is ”transmitted”
to the decision equation and lj is a function of it. Simple OLS estimates of the production
function coefficients will be biased and will not have the desired structural interpretation.
There is a second problem, perhaps less emphasized and documented in the literature,
embedded in the OLS estimation of (2.1). Firm-level dataset are usually characterized by a
significant level of attrition, i.e. firms entering and exiting but, obviously, researches have
only data on firms prior to exiting. Assume firms can observe εj , then decide whether to
exit or not, and choose labor and level of production optimally if they decided not to exit.
Abstracting from dynamics implications, assume also that firms deciding to exit receive a
non-negative remuneration equal to their sell-off value, thus firms will exit if the variable
profits are lower than the sell-off value. The problem here is that this exit condition will
generate correlation between εj and Kj , conditional on continuing to be in the dataset, i.e.
continuing to produce. This is because, if firms know their εj when they have to decide
whether to exit or stay, firms continuing to produce will have εj drawn from a selected
sample and the selection will be partially dependent on the fixed input Kj . In other
words, as firms with higher fixed capital are able to afford lower εj without having to exit,
the sample selection of the firms remaining in business will generate negative correlation
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between εj and Kj . Once again, the orthogonality conditions for OLS estimation would
be violated.
2.2 Traditional solutions: instrumental variables and fixed effects
The earliest responses to the concerns about the necessity of considering the endogeneity
issues in production functions estimation came through the increasing availability of panel
data and developed, traditionally, along two main directions: instrumental variables and
fixed effects.
2.2.1 Fixed effects
Hoch and Mundlak were the pioneers in introducing the fixed effects methodology in eco-
nomics in the context of production functions estimation. To understand the essence of
this approach consider a modified formulation of (2.1)
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + ωj + ηjt (2.5)
where ηjt is not observed by the firm before any production decision (input choice or exit)
so that this term is not correlated with the firm’s optimal choices. Conversely firms have
knowledge of ωj when they make input and exit choices. Intuitively, ωj can represent en-
trepreneurial ability, labor quality, or any other factor affecting the production that firm
can observe or predict and it is usually defined as the firms’ unobserved (by the econo-
metrician) productivity. ηjt, on the other hand, represents deviations from the expected
values of these factors and can be also thought as the conventional measurement error in yjt
that is uncorrelated with input and exit decisions. Clearly the endogeneity issues concern
only ωj and not ηjt. The fact that ωj is assumed to be constant over time, or at least
over the length of the available panel, is the basic premise behind fixed effects estimation
and allows for consistent estimation of production function coefficients using differencing,
or least squares dummy variables estimation techniques. In general this implies that (2.5)
can be consistently estimated via OLS specifying
(yjt − yjt¯) = βk(kjt − kjt¯) + βl(ljt − ljt¯) + (ηjt − ηjt¯) (2.6)
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where the notation (xjt − xjt¯) represents averaging over the time dimension for each indi-
vidual firm1.
This approach is first stated briefly in Hoch (1955) and fully developed in Hoch (1962).
In this latter contribution, Hoch makes use of combined time-series and cross-section data
in the estimation of production function parameters for a sample of 63 Minnesota farms
over a six-year period from 1946 to 1951. The main goal of the study is to estimate the
elasticity of output with respect to inputs in order to draw inferences regarding the allo-
cation of resources by the economic units of the sample. A Cobb-Douglas specification is
used to derive a condition stating that firms equate the value of the marginal product of
each input to its price multiplied by some constant. This constant represents the elasticity
of output with respect to that input and can be interpreted as returns to scale. If firms are
in fact profit maximizers, the value of the constant should be one as optimality requires the
value of the marginal product to be the same as the price of the factor. Hoch argues that
rationalizing the use of single equation estimates of the production function parameters
is possible if one is willing to assume that firms maximize by differentiating anticipated
output with respect to current input so that the observed input choices are not correlated
with the disturbance term. The extent to which this assumption can be supported depends
on the characteristics of the industry where the firms operates. In the case of agriculture,
for example, it seems reasonable to believe that the term εj includes the effects of weather
variability which do not affect the optimal choice of inputs. In this context a single equa-
tion estimation is justifiable. There are, however, other differences between firms, such as
difference in technical efficiency, that will influence both output and inputs. Hoch points
out that if there are differences in technical efficiency between firms, i.e. ωj in (2.5) varies
substantially across firms, firms that are more efficient will be able to produce more out-
put for a given level of inputs and, by profit maximization, they will tend to have higher
levels on inputs, thus the optimal choice of factors will depend on ωj . A similar problem
arises if productivity increases over time. As a way out of this difficulty, Hoch uses the
analysis of covariance exploiting the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of his data
and estimating a system of equations similar to (2.3) and (2.4) including firm-specific and
time-specific fixed effects in the production function equation. Since differences between
firms and time periods affecting both output and input choices are accounted for these
fixed effects, he argues that his model does not suffer from simultaneous equations bias.
1In the case of first-differencing (2.6) would be (yjt−yjt−1) = βk(kjt−kjt−1)+βl(ljt−ljt−1)+(ηjt−ηjt−1).
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Despite the innovative approach, Hoch’s results are not very encouraging. Moving from
time correction estimates, where only time effects are included, to analysis of covariance
estimates where also farm effects are considered, there is a significant drop in the estimated
sum of elasticities, from almost 1 to approximately 0.75 which, in turn, generates unrea-
sonably low estimated marginal returns (around 0.20) to labor. These figures force him
to (questionably) interpret the shortfall as reflecting the fact that efficiency may increase
with scale and that there may be returns to the unmeasured, fixed entrepreneurial factor.
Mundlak further exploits the fixed effect approach in his 1961 contribution with the
scope of obtaining unbiased production function estimates in the presence of unobserved
managerial ability. He notes that, instead of trying to rationalize the concept and the
meaning of managerial capacity in order to include some index of management in the pro-
duction function, one should assume that, whatever management is, it does not change
substantially over time and, for at least a two year period, it can assumed to remain con-
stant. Mundlak assumes a Cobb-Douglas specification very similar to (2.5) apart from the
fact that the management variable is included among the inputs and has its own (con-
stant) coefficient to be estimated. However, since management is not directly observable,
the specification taken to the data is exactly the same as (2.5) with ωj = cmj being firm’s j
fixed effect, mj being management, and c being the constant multiplicative term associated
with it. If the production function is fully specified and the assumption of the classical
regression model hold, unbiased and efficient estimates can be obtained using the analysis
of covariance. Moreover, imposing the additional restrictions that management is the only
fixed input for all firms, for at least a two year period, and that there are constant returns
to scale, unbiased estimates of c and Mj (where Mj = exp(mj)) can also be recovered.
Mundlak’s results, obtained using a sample of 66 family farms in Israel from 1954 to 1958,
show that management is positively correlated with most of the inputs and that the firm
fixed effects are significantly different from zero, suggesting that the estimates obtained
adopting a specification that does not include them are likely to be biased. However, the
elasticity of output is fairly close to one when only time effects are considered, but drops to
0.87 when only firm fixed effects are present, and to 0.79 when both year and firm effects
are included. Moreover, the ”unbiased” model (where unbiased is the model including both
year and firm effects which are found to be significant) delivers, again, an unrealistically
low elasticity labor of 0.11 demonstrating that controlling explicitly for management bias
does not necessarily improves on the credibility of the results.
The unsatisfactory results - low and often insignificant capital coefficients and unreason-
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ably low returns to scale - obtained in the literature prove that the fixed effects framework,
valid in theory, is not particularly successful in solving the endogeneity problem in prac-
tice. There are a number of reasons why this is the case. First, in order for the fixed
effects methodology to be applicable, one needs to rely on the rather strong assumption
that the unobserved productivity term ωj is constant over time. This assumption is be-
coming less justifiable now that longer panel datasets are more easily available. Moreover,
researchers are usually interested in studying major changes in the economic environment
and, since significant changes are likely to affect different firms’ productivity differently,
firms are likely to adjust their optimal decision accordingly. If this is the case ωj will
obviously not be constant over time anymore. Second, when there is measurement error in
inputs, the within transformation of the data through differencing may actually aggravate
this problem and the estimates obtained with fixed effects are actually even less reliable
than the OLS estimates. Nonetheless we can see the fixed effects approach as a useful and
simple reduced-form way of exploring the data by decomposing the firms’ heterogeneity
into within and between effects.
2.2.2 Instrumental variables
The second classical solution to the endogeneity issue proposed in the literature is the use
of instrumental variables. Consider a slight modification of (2.5)
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + ωjt + ηjt (2.7)
where now the term ωjt is allowed to change by firm and over time. Valid instruments
would be variables that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, in this
case inputs, but do not enter the production function explicitly and are not correlated
with the production function residuals. The theory of production provides some indication
regarding natural candidates to be valid instruments: input prices. Input prices certainly
influence input choices, as they are part of the input demand functions, but do not directly
enter the production function. Moreover, input prices need to be uncorrelated with ωj and
this will depend on the nature of competition in the input market. Specifically, if input
markets are perfectly competitive, firms take input prices as given, thus input prices are
appropriate instruments. Other possible instruments would be output prices, once again
under the condition that output markets are competitive, or any other variable that shifts
either the demand for output or the supply of inputs. Nevertheless input prices are usually
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the most popular instruments because perfect competition is a more plausible assumption
in input markets than in output markets.
In the wake of the ”duality” revolution in production function theory, Nerlove (1963)
is one of the very few successful contributions in the literature making use of input prices
as instruments. His investigation on the returns to scale in electricity supply relays on
several characteristics that render the U.S. electric power industry unique. Power cannot
be stored in large quantities and must be supplied on demand; revenues from the sale of
power by private companies depend primarily on rates set by public regulatory bodies; the
input markets in this industry can be reasonably assumed to be competitive since fuel used
in power production is purchased under long-term contracts at set prices, the industry is
heavily unionized, and capital markets for utility companies are highly competitive. These
features describe an industry where the output of a firm and the prices it pays for the
production factors can be regarded as exogenous, even if the industry does not operate
in perfectly competitive markets. Thus, the problem of the individual firm appears to be
that of minimizing the total cost of production of output, subject to the given production
function technology and factor prices. Specifically, if the production function is assumed
to be a generalized Cobb-Douglas of the form:
Yj = AjK
βk
j L
βl
j F
βf
j Uj (2.8)
where capital K, labor L, and fuel F are the inputs of production and U is a residual
expressing neutral variations in efficiency among firms, the problem of each firm j consists
of minimizing the cost of production
min
K,L,F
Cj = pkjKj + pljLj + pfjFj (2.9)
subject to (2.8). The marginal productivity conditions associated with this problem are
given by:
pkjKj
βk
=
pljLj
βl
=
pfjFj
βf
(2.10)
If the efficiency among firms varies neutrally, as indicated by the error term in (2.8), and
the factor prices vary across firms, the input choices are not independent, but determined
jointly by firm’s efficiency, level of output and factor prices and the system of structural
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relations (2.8) and (2.10) suffers from simultaneity bias. However, if factor price data are
available and factor prices do not move proportionally, it is possible to express the cost
function as a reduced form of the system of equations (2.8) and (2.10)
cj = kj +
1
γ
yj +
βk
γ
ln(pkj) +
βl
γ
ln(plj) +
βf
γ
ln(pfj) + vj (2.11)
where lowercase letters denote natural logarithms and γj = βk+βl+βf . Assuming constant
returns to scale, (2.11) can be rewritten as:
cj − ln(pfj) = kj + 1
γ
yj +
βk
γ
[ln(pkj)− ln(pfj)] + βl
γ
[ln(plj)− ln(pfj)] + vj (2.12)
The fundamental duality between cost and production function, demonstrated by Shephard
(1953), guarantees that the relation between the cost function empirically estimated and
the underlying production function is unique. In other words, under the cost minimization
assumption, cost functions and production functions are simply two different but equivalent
ways of looking at the same concept.
Nerlove estimates (2.12) using data on 145 privately owned electrical utilities in 1955 and
his main findings can be summarized as follows. There is substantial evidence of increasing
returns to scale, but the degree of returns to scale varies inversely with output, especially
for larger firms. The scale of operation affects the degree of returns to scale, but is does
not significantly affect the marginal rate of substitution between factors of productions for
given factor ratios. The elasticities of output with respect to labor and fuel are positive
and of a plausible magnitude, while the elasticity of output with respect to capital is often
very small and in some cases even negative.
Despite being a remarkable and innovative contribution, the peculiar environment and
data used in Nerlove’s study demonstrates why the instrumental variables approach, even
if theoretically sound, may be challenging to apply in practice. First, firms do not usually
report input prices and when they do, especially in the case of labor costs, they tend to
report average wage per worker or per hour of labor. Ideally, the cost of labor should
measure exogenous differences in labor market conditions, but it often capture also some
component of unmeasured worker quality. It is very possible, for example, that firms
employing higher quality workers will pay higher average wages. In this case the cost
of labor will be correlated with the production function residuals and its validity as an
instrument will be compromised. Second, the use of input prices an instruments requires
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that these variables have sufficient variation to identify production function coefficients.
While input prices clearly change over time, they usually do not vary significantly across
firms as inputs market conditions tend to be fairly national in scope. If input prices do not
differ enough across firms in the data, or if the observed differences reflect unobserved input
quality and not exogenous input market characteristics, the instrumental variable approach
is not applicable. A third issue arises because the instrumental variables framework relies
on the strong assumption that the term ωjt in (2.7) evolves independently from input
choices over time, thus firms cannot affect the evolution of ωjt through input decisions.
If this assumption does not hold, i.e. if the evolution in ωjt is correlated with some
inputs, finding valid instruments would require to identify variables that affect only those
input choices without simultaneously affecting other input choices. Since individual input
choices most likely depend on the prices of all inputs of production, the task to select valid
instruments in such a context appears extremely challenging. Finally, the instrumental
variables approach only addresses the endogeneity of input choice, not the endogeneity
of firms’ exit. If exit is endogenous, it will possibly depend, in part, on input prices so
that firms facing higher input prices will be more likely to exit. This generates correlation
between input prices, used as instruments, and the residuals in the production function
rendering the instruments invalid.
2.3 Structural solutions
In the last twenty years, the increasing availability of firm-level data opened the door to
more structural approaches to identifying production function coefficients controlling for
simultaneity and selection problems.
2.3.1 The Olley and Pakes approach
Olley and Pakes, henceforth OP, in their 1996 contribution propose an innovative empirical
framework with the goal of quantifying the impact of deregulation on measures of plant-
level productivity in the U.S. telecommunication equipment industry between 1974 and
1987. Considering firms operating through discrete time, making production decisions to
maximize the present discounted value of current and future profits, OP make use of the
following assumptions. First, the production function is given by:
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + βlljt + ωjt + ηjt (2.13)
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where ajt is the age (in years) of the plant expressed in natural logarithms. The motiva-
tion for introducing plant’s age as an additional input is to analyze the impact of age on
productivity.
Second, the unobserved productivity ωjt evolves exogenously following a first-order Markov
process of the form:
p(ωjt+1|{ωiτ}tτ=0}, Ijt) = p(ωjt+1|ωjt) (2.14)
where Ijt is firm j’s information set at time t, and current and past realization of ω, i.e.
{ωjt, · · ·ωj0} are assumed to be part of Ijt. This is simultaneously an econometric assump-
tion on the statistical properties of the unobservable term ωjt and economic assumption
on the way firms form their expectations on the evolution of their productivity over time.
Specifically, at time t + 1 these expectations depend only on the realization occurred at
time t. Moreover the first-order Markov process is assumed to be stochastically increasing
over time, i.e. a firm with a higher ωjt today expects to have a better distribution of ωjt+1
tomorrow.
Third, capital is accumulated by firms through a deterministic dynamic investment process
specified as:
kjt = (1− δ)kjt−1 + ijt−1 (2.15)
This formulation implies that the firm’s capital stock at period t was actually decided,
through investment, at period t− 1. Finally, the per-period profit function is given by:
pi(kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t)− c(ijt,∆t) (2.16)
Note that labor ljt does not explicitly enter the profit function as it is considered a vari-
able, non-dynamic input. Labor is variable in the sense that it is chosen and utilized
in production in the same period and it is non-dynamic, unlike capital, because current
labor decision do not impact future profits, i.e. labor is not a state variable. Therefore
pi(kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t) can be thought as a conditional profit function, where the conditioning
is on the optimal static choice of labor input. Note also that both pi(·) and c(·) depend on
∆t which represents the economic environment where firms operate in a specific period.
∆ is allowed to change overtime but, in a given time period, is considered to be constant
across firms.
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The firm maximization problem can be described by the following Bellman equation:
Vt(kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t) = max {Φ, sup
ijt≥0
pi(kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t)− c(ijt,∆t)
+βE[Vt+1(kjt+1, ajt+1, ωjt+1,∆t+1)|Ijt]} (2.17)
where Φ represents the sell-off value of the firm, and Ijt is, once again, the information
available to the firm at time t, i.e. (kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t, ijt). The Bellman equation specifies
that each firm compares its sell-off value and the expected discounted returns of staying
in business. If the current state variables (kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t) indicate that continuing in
operation is not profitable, the firm will exit, while, in the opposite case it will choose an
optimal, positive, investment level. Under the appropriate assumptions that an equilibrium
exists and the difference in profits between continuing and exiting is increasing in ωjt, i.e.
firms with higher ωjt are more likely to realize higher profits and thus decide to stay
in business, the solution to the control problem in (2.17) generates an exit rule and an
investment demand function. Defining χjt as the indicator function that takes the value of
zero when the firm decides to exit we have that the exit decision rule and the investment
demand function are written, respectively, as:
χjt =
{
1 if ωjt ≥ ω¯jt(kjt, ajt,∆t) = ω¯t(kjt, ajt)
0 otherwise
(2.18)
and
ijt = i(kjt, ajt, ωjt,∆t) = it(kjt, ajt, ωjt) (2.19)
Investment is assumed to be strictly monotonic in ω as, conditional on kjt and ajt, firms
with higher ωjt will optimally invest more.
As long investment as is positive, since (2.19) is strictly monotonic in ωjt, it is possible
to invert it and generate
ωjt = ht(kjt, ajt, ijt) (2.20)
which simply implies that, given a firm’s levels of kjt and ajt, the investment demand ijt
provides sufficient information about ωjt. This is because OP makes a scalar unobserv-
able assumption, i.e. they assume that ωjt is the only unobservable in the investment
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demand and there are no other unobservable (by the econometrician) variables that affect
investment but not production.
Substituting (2.20) into (2.13) yields
yjt = βlljk + φt(kjt, ajt, ijt) + ηjt (2.21)
where φt(kjt, ajt, ijt) = β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + ht(kjt, ajt, ijt). Equation (2.21) is taken to the
data in a first stage regression to recover an estimate of the labor coefficient. This is possible
because the monotonicity and scalar unobservable assumption allows for ”observing” the
unobservable ω through investment eliminating the endogeneity problem for the labor
coefficient. In this first stage of the estimation, however, the coefficients on capital and age
are not identified because in (2.20) it is not possible to separate the effect of capital and
age on the investment decision from their effect on output.
Rewriting (2.13) taking the term βlljt to the left-hand-side and taking expectation of
both sides results in
E[yjt − βlljt|Ijt−1, χjt = 1] = E[β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + ωjt + ηjt]
= β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + E[ωjt|Ijt−1, χjt = 1] (2.22)
The second line comes from the fact that kjt and ajt are known at time t− 1 and ηjt is, by
definition, uncorrelated with Ijt−1 and exit. The last term of (2.22) can be expanded as:
E[ωjt|Ijt−1, χjt = 1] = E[ωjt|Ijt−1, ωjt ≥ ω¯t(kjt, ajt) (2.23)
=
∫ ∞
ω¯t(kjt,ajt)
ωjt
p(ωjt|ωjt−1)∫∞
ω¯t(kjt,ajt)
p(ωjt|ωjt−1)
dωjt
= g(ωjt−1, ω¯t(kjt, ajt))
where the first equality depends on the exit rule expressed in (2.18) and the last two lines
from the exogenous first-order Markos process assumption on ωjt.
While it is possible to estimate ωjt−1 since, from (2.21), for a given set of parameters
(β0, βk, βa), ωˆjt−1(β0, βk, βa) = φˆjt−1−β0−βkkjt−1−βaajt−1, there is not direct knowledge
of ω¯t(kjt, ajt). OP try to control for ω¯ using data on observed exit. In fact, the probability
of continuing operating at period t, conditional on the information available in the previous
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period is
Pr(χjt = 1|It−1) = Pr(ωjt ≥ ω¯t(kjt, ajt)|Ijt−1) (2.24)
= Pr(χjt = 1|ωjt, ω¯t(kjt, ajt))
= ϕ˜t(ωjt−1, kjt, ajt)
= ϕt(ijt−1, kjt−1, ajt−1)
= Pjt
where the first equality comes, again, form the exit rule (2.18) and the remaining equalities
come from (2.20) and the fact that kjt and ajt are deterministic functions of ijt−1, kjt−1,
and ajt−1. OP obtain an estimate of Pˆjt, i.e. the probability of firm j surviving to period
t, through non-parametric methods.
Equation (2.24) also implies that ω¯t(kjt, ajt) is a function of ωjt−1 and Pjt. Thus (2.22)
becomes
E[yjt − βlljt|Ijt−1, χjt = 1] = β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + g(ωjt−1, f(ωjt−1, Pjt)) (2.25)
= β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + g
′(ωjt−1, Pjt)
= β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + g
′(φjt−1 − β0 − βkkjt−1 − βaajt−1, Pjt)
The second stage in OP estimation requires to take to the data the following expression:
yjt − βlljt = βkkjt + βaajt + g˜′(φjt−1 − βkkjt−1 − βaajt−1, Pjt) + ξjt + ηjt (2.26)
where the function g˜′ includes the constant term β0, and ξjt represents the innovation in
productivity with ξjt = ωjt − E[ωjt|ωjt−1, χjt = 1]. Substituting Pˆjt, φˆjt, and βˆl, (2.26)
can be estimated approximating the g˜′ function with polynomial or kernel methods. The
coefficients associated with capital and age, βk and βa, can be identified in (2.26) because,
given the information structure, the innovation in productivity is uncorrelated with kjt
and ajt since these two variables are only function of the information at t − 1, so that
the orthogonality condition E[ξjt + ηjt|Ijt−1, χjt = 1] = 0 holds. On the other hand, the
labor input at time t is plausibly correlated with ξjt since it is free to adjust to shocks
in productivity, thus the first stage of the estimation is needed to identify βl. Finally, in
(2.26) βk and βa are identified making use of the cross-sectional variation in kjt and ajt for
firms with the same ωjt−1 and Pjt and the time variation in input usage across firms that
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have the same ωjt−1 and Pjt.
Olley and Pakes’ findings demonstrate how important the bias created by not control-
ling for productivity and endogenous exit can be. Comparing the results obtained with
their alternative method and the more classical OLS and fixed effect approaches, for both
a balanced panel and the full sample (constructed be including exiting and entering firms),
they find remarkable differences. Specifically, under OLS and fixed effects the coefficient on
labor is overestimated and the coefficient on capital is heavily underestimated with respect
to the OP approach and the differences are even larger when considering the balanced
panel instead of the full sample. Qualitatively, the results show that changes in the regula-
tory structure of the telecommunication industry were followed by an increase in industry
productivity generated, mainly, by a reallocation of capital and a shift in production to-
wards more productive plants. Significant entry and exit appear to have facilitated this
reallocation process.
2.3.2 The Levinson and Petrin approach
Levinson and Petrin (2003), LP henceforth, take a similar approach to Olley and Pakes for
conditioning out serially correlated unobserved shocks in production function estimation.
The key difference in their contribution is that they use an intermediate input demand
function as a proxy for productivity instead of the investment demand function. The
rationale behind this choice is that the OP procedure requires the investment function
to be strictly monotonic in ωjt in order to be inverted. Formally, the inversion can be
done also in the presence of zero or lumpy investment levels, but zero or lumpy investment
levels cast doubt on the strict monotonicity assumption on investment. On the other hand,
restricting the sample to the sole observations for which ijt > 0 could create a significant
loss in efficiency. Specifically, LP observe that in the Chilean manufacturing dataset from
1979 to 1986 they use in their study more than fifty percent of the plant-year observations
have zero investment level. Discarding these observations would imply loosing more than
half of the sample with an obvious efficiency loss. In addition, LP note that investment is
a control on a state variable that, by definition, may be costly to adjust. If investment is
subject to non-convex adjustment costs, the investment function may present kinks that
affect the reaction of investment to the transmitted productivity shock. In this case, the
error term ηjt in (2.21) will be correlated with ljt and the identification assumption on βl
would not hold.
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To avoid the issues related to potentially large efficiency loss and adjustment cost non-
convexities while using investment, LP suggest using intermediate inputs choices (energy
or materials) to proxy for ωjt as these variables are rarely zero and do not suffer from
significant adjustment cost, thus the strict monotonicity assumption is more easily satisfied.
They consider the production function
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + ωjt + ηjt (2.27)
where mjt (intermediate input) is an additional input in production that, like labor, is
assumed to be variable and non-dynamic. The intermediate input demand equation is
specified as:
mjt = mt(kjt, ωjt) (2.28)
with the subscript t indicating that factors like input prices, market structure, or demand
condition that can influence the demand for materials, are allowed to vary across time but
not across firms. Note that (2.28) implies specific timing assumptions regarding the choice
of mjt. First, the intermediate input in period t is a function of ωjt, i.e. it is chosen at
the time production takes place. Second, labor does not enter (2.28) meaning that labor
is chosen at the same time as intermediate inputs and, therefore, ljt has no impact on the
optimal choice of mjt.
Assuming monotonicity of the intermediate input demand in ωjt, analogously to OP, (2.28)
is inverted to generate
ωjt = ht(kjt,mjt) (2.29)
Then, substituting (2.29) into (2.27) yields
yjt = βlljt + φt(kjt,mjt) + ht(kjt,mjt) + ηjt (2.30)
The first stage of the LP procedure involves obtaining an estimate for βl and φt(kjt,mjt) =
β0 + βkkjt + βmmjt + ht(kjt,mjt) treating ht non-parametrically. Note that βk and βm are
not separately identified from the non-parametric function in this first stage. The second
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stage of LP consists of estimating
yjt − βlljt = βkkjt + βmmjt + g˜′(φjt−1 − βkkjt−1 − βmmjt−1) + ξjt + ηjt (2.31)
Since kjt is assumed to be decided at period t− 1 it is orthogonal to the residual ξjt + ηjt.
However, since mjt is a variable input, it is certainly not orthogonal to the innovation
component of productivity, ξjt, as ωjt is observed at the time the intermediate input is
chosen. Thus LP use its lag, mjt−1, as an instrument for mjt, such that the orthogonality
condition E[ξjt + ηjt|Ijt−1] = 0 is satisfied for both kjt−1 and mjt−1.
Levinson and Petrin find that using materials or electricity as a proxy for the unobserved
productivity yields statistically significant estimates of the production function parameters
for the Chilean manufacturing industry. Moreover, in line with Olley and Pakes, they also
observe that, comparing their estimates with estimates obtained using OLS, the coeffi-
cient on labor is consistently upward biased and the opposite is true for the coefficient
on capital. A final comparison between estimates obtained using the investment as proxy
(OP method) and estimates using the intermediate input demand (LP method) delivers
also higher coefficients on labor and lower coefficients on capital under the OP method
suggesting that, at least in the case of the Chilean plants, the intermediate input seems to
respond more fully to the productivity shock than investment.
2.3.3 The Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer approach
Both OP and LP procedures rely on a crucial assumption regarding the nature of the
labor decision, i.e. labor is not a state variable and, therefore, does not have implication
in the firm’s dynamic optimization problem. Nonetheless, Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer,
henceforth ACF, (2006) note that, if there are significant hiring or firing costs, or if a firm is
highly unionized so that labor contracts are long term, current labor choices have dynamic
implications and labor becomes a state variable.
In this case (2.20) and (2.29) become ωjt = ht(kjt, ljt, ajt, ijt) and ωjt = ht(kjt, ljt,mjt),
respectively, and the labor coefficient βl cannot be identified from the first stage in neither
OP or LP estimation because it is not possible to separate the impact of labor on the
production from its impact on the non-parametric ht(·) function. In other words, if the
optimal labor choice is determined according to ljt = ft(ωjt, kjt) = ft(ht(·), kjt), it is
not feasible to simultaneously estimate a fully non-parametric, time-varying function of
(kjt, ωjt) along with a coefficient associated with a variable, ljt, that is merely a time-varying
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function of those same variables (kjt, ωjt). ACF further argue that the collinearity problem
that prevents identification of βl in the first stage is more serious and less easy to overcome
in the LP approach than in the OP one. This is because the former method uses a proxy for
productivity, the intermediate input demand, that is chosen in period t simultaneously with
labor and production level after observing ωjt, while the latter method relies on investment
as a proxy that, by definition, is not directly linked to period t outcomes.
ACF suggest an alternative estimation procedure that avoids the collinearity problems
arising in the estimation of the labor coefficient adopting a mild modification on the timing
assumption for input choices. The main difference between their approach and OP and
LP is that in the first stage no coefficient is estimated, instead the first stage serves the
purpose of netting out the error from the production function ηjt.
More specifically, in the case of the intermediate input demand, with a production function
specified as in (2.7), ACF assume that labor ljt is chosen by firms at time t − b, with
(0 < b < 1), after capital kjt was chosen at or before t− 1 but prior to mjt being chosen at
t. The productivity process is assumed to evolve according to a first-order Markov process
between the sub-periods t− 1 and t− b, i.e.
p(ωjt|Ijt−b) = p(ωjt|ωjt−b) and p(ωjt−b|Ijt−1) = p(ωjt−b|ωjt−1) (2.32)
(2.32) simply implies that labor and intermediates are both variable inputs with labor
being ”less variable” than intermediates. Also labor is not a function of ωjt, but of ωjt−b.
With these timing assumption the demand for intermediate input and labor, respectively,
are given by:
mjt = mt(kjt, ljt, ωjt) (2.33)
ljt = ft(kjt, ωjt−b) (2.34)
and the collinearity problem has been solved as mjt is now a function of (kjt, ωjt−b, ωjt).
Substituting into the production function, the first stage estimating equation in the ACF
is given by:
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + ht(kjt, ljt,mjt) + ηjt (2.35)
where ht(·) is, once again, the inverse of (2.33) used as proxi for ωjt. As mentioned before,
ACF run the first stage just to obtain an estimate of φt(kjt, ljt,mjt) = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt +
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ht(kjt, ljt,mjt) in order to isolate ηjt and proceed to the second stage to estimate both
βk and βl. This now requires two independent moment conditions for identification. The
Markov process assumption on ωjt implies that ωjt = E[ωjt|Ijt−1]+ξjt = E[wjt|ωjt−1]+ξjt
so that ξjt is mean-independent of all the information known at t− 1. Since kjt is decided
at t− 1 and lt−1 is decided at t− b− 1, both kjt and lt−1 are included in the information
set It−1 so the orthogonality conditions required to identify βk and βl are
E
[
ξjt
∣∣∣∣∣ kjtljt−1
]
= 0 (2.36)
For a given set of parameters (βk, βl), ACF compute the implied value of ωˆjt(βk, βl) =
φˆjt − βkkjt − βlljt, then non-parametrically regress ωˆjt on ωˆjt−1 to obtain xˆijt(βk, βl), and
finally form the sample analogue
1
T
1
N
∑
t
∑
n
ξjt(βk, βl)
(
kjt
ljt−1
)
(2.37)
estimating (βk, βl) by minimizing (2.37).
In the case of the investment demand used as a proxy for ωjt the ACF procedure is analo-
gous as the procedure just described with the exception of (2.33) becoming
ijt = ht(kjt, ljt, ωjt) (2.38)
and (2.35) becoming
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + ht(kjt, ljt, ijt) + ηjt (2.39)
Once again ht(·) is the inverse of (2.38) and φt(kjt, ljt, ijt) = β0+βkkjt+βlljt+ht(kjt, ljt, ijt).
ACF assert that their framework is completely consistent with labor choices having
dynamic implications and with other unobservables (eg. input prices shocks or dynamic
adjustment costs) impacting firm’s choices of capital and labor. The results, obtained using
the same Chilean manufacturing data as Levinson and Petrin, show how the estimates,
obtained with their alternative procedure, differs significantly from both the classical OLS
and LP methods. Specifically, the returns to scale estimated under OLS are higher than
under ACF and this is mainly due to the fact that, as expected, the coefficient on labor
is upward biased when not controlling for productivity shocks. Comparing ACF with LP
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estimates, they find that the coefficients are generally different in magnitude, with LP
estimates of the labor coefficient being more often smaller than their ACF counterparts,
suggesting that βˆl, which comes from the first stage in LP, may be downward biased because
of the discussed collinearity issue.
2.4 Alternative solutions: dynamic panel models and endogenous pro-
ductivity
2.4.1 Dynamic panel data methods
An alternative response to the simultaneity issues in production function estimation came
from the dynamic panel data literature starting with Chamberlain (1982). Dynamic panel
methods essentially extend the fixed effect framework allowing for a more sophisticated
error structure and combine it with instrumental variables to control for collinearity. To
see how this approach is developed consider the production function
yjt = βkkjt + βlljt + (αj + ωjt + ηjt) (2.40)
= βkkjt + βlljt + ψjt (2.41)
where the composite error term ψjt is the sum of all three error components, i.e. the un-
observed, time-invariant firm-specific effect αj , the productivity shock ωjt, and the serially
uncorrelated residual term ηjt.
The dynamic panel methodology relies on specific assumptions regarding the evolution
of the error components αj , ωjt, and ηjt, and the correlation structure between these
error components and the explanatory variables kjt and ljt. Given these assumptions, the
estimation procedure requires finding functions of the aggregated error term ψjt that are
uncorrelated with past, present, or future values of the explanatory variables. Commonly
the imposed assumptions are as follows. First, the time invariant error component αj
may be correlated with capital and labor. Second, the term ηjt is i.i.d. over time and
uncorrelated with capital and labor in every period. Third, the productivity process is
usually modeled as a first-order linear autoregressive process of the form ωjt = ρωjt−1 +ξjt.
Lastly, while ωjt is likely to be correlated with kjt and ljt, the innovation on ωjt between
t− 1 and t, ξjt, is uncorrelated with all the input choices prior to period t. This is because
the innovation in ωjt is observed by the firm after period t − 1 so that ξjt is uncorrelated
with input chosen at t− 1 or earlier. Note that the rationale behind this last assumption
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is similar to that behind the second stage identification conditions in OP, LP, and ACF.
Given that ωjt is AR(1), (2.40) has the dynamic common factor representation
yjt = βkkjt − ρβkkjt−1 + βlljt − ρβlljt−1
+ ρyjt−1 + ((1− ρ)αj + ξjt + ηjt − ρηjt−1) (2.42)
and given the definitions of ψjt and ωjt the following function of ψjt can be specified:
(ψjt − ρψjt−1)− (ψjt−1 − ρψjt−2) = ξjt − ξjt−1 + (ηjt − ρηjt−1)− (ηjt−1 − ρηjt−2) (2.43)
Note that (2.43) contains only ηjt and the innovation in productivity, as the terms con-
taining αj have been differenced out. Moreover, since ξjt and ξjt−1 have been assumed to
be uncorrelated with the input choices prior to t − 1 and ηjt is always uncorrelated with
the the input choices, an appropriate moment condition for estimating βk, βl, and ρ would
be
E
(ψjt − ρψjt−1)− (ψjt−1 − ρψjt−2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
{
kjτ
ljτ
}t−2
τ=1
 = 0 (2.44)
(2.44) can be easily used to construct a sample analogue since (2.41) implies that, for
given values of the parameter (βk, βl) any ψjt is observable. If the assumption that ηjt is
uncorrelated with kjt and ljt in all time periods appears too strong, it can be substituted
with the weaker assumption that ηjt is sequentially exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with all
inputs chosen prior to t. In this case, (2.44) does not hold anymore but can be substituted
with
E
(ψjt − ρψjt−1)− (ψjt−1 − ρψjt−2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
{
kjτ
ljτ
}t−3
τ=1
 = 0 (2.45)
because, while ηt−2 is potentially correlated with kjt−2 and ljt−2, it is uncorrelated with
capital and labor decision prior to t− 2.
(2.44) and (2.45) summarize the essence of the dynamic panel methodology, i.e. GMM
estimators, which take first differences to eliminate firm-specific effects (αj) and use lagged
instruments to correct for simultaneity in the first-differenced equations, can be applied to
estimate production function coefficients.
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Blundell and Bond (2000), however, comment that the methodology described above
tends to produce unsatisfactory results in the context of production function estimation.
They mainly attribute this poor performance to the weak correlations that exist between
the current growth rates of capital and labor and the lagged levels of these variables which
result in weak instruments in the first-differenced GMM estimation procedure.
Using a panel of R&D performing US manufacturing firms between 1982 and 1989, Blundell
and Bond propose to estimate (2.41) making use of (2.45) together with the following
additional moment condition:
E
 kjτ − kjτ−1ljτ − ljτ−1
}t−3
τ=2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ψjt
 = 0 (2.46)
The moment condition in (2.45) allow the use of appropriately lagged levels of the variables
as instruments in the first-differenced production function equation, while the moment
condition in (2.46) allows the use of appropriately lagged first differences of the variables as
instruments for the production function equation in levels. Both sets of moment conditions
can be exploited as a linear GMM estimator in a system containing both first-differenced
and levels equations. Their coefficient estimates obtained via the system GMM estimator
are much more reasonable than the ones obtained under simple OLS, fixed effects, or the
first-differenced GMM estimator with only the moment condition in (2.45). More precisely,
the results show that the capital coefficient is higher and strongly significant, the additional
instruments used in the system GMM are valid, and the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale cannot be rejected in the data.
2.4.2 Estimating endogenous productivity
In all the frameworks presented so far the productivity process has been considered con-
stant over a given period of time (fixed effects), or exogenous (structural approaches and
dynamic panel methods), in the sense that firms’ optimal decision do not affect the evolu-
tion in productivity. This modeling choice is mainly driven by the fact that endogenizing
this process is problematic in the context of standard estimation procedures.
Nonetheless, it seems very reasonable to assume that firms can optimally choose to under-
take activities to increment their productivity. A straightforward example is investment in
R&D which generates knowledge-based assets accumulation, just like investment if physical
capital, changing the firm’s relative position with respect to other firms.
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Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, DJ henceforth, in their very recent 2013 contribution
develop a dynamic model of endogenous productivity change where firms carry out two
types of investment, one if physical capital and another in knowledge through R&D expen-
diture. Firms operate through discrete time and make production decisions with the goal
of maximizing the present discounted value of current and future profits. Each firm face a
Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + ωjt + ηjt (2.47)
Capital accumulation follows the investment process described in (2.15) and the usual
i.i.d. across time and across firms assumption on ηjt holds. However, the key difference
in this model is that the evolution of firm-level productivity over time is endogenized and
productivity is assumed to be governed by a controlled first-order Markov process
p(ωjt|ωjt−1, rjt−1) (2.48)
with rjt being R&D expenditure expressed in natural logarithms. The firm’s dynamic
maximization problem is summarized by the Bellman equation
Vt(kjtωjt) = max
ijt,rjt
pi(kjtωjt)− Ci(ijt)− Cr(rjt) + βE[Vt+1(kjt+1, ωjt+1)|Ijt] (2.49)
where pi(·) denotes per-period profits, Ci(·) and Cr(·) are cost functions for investment
and R&D, respectively, and Ijt represent the information set at time t that includes
(kjt, ωjt, ijt, rjt). The solution to (2.49) generates two policy function it(kjt, ωjt) and
rt(kjt, ωjt) for investment in physical capital and knowledge. The firms anticipates the
effect of R&D on ωt when making decisions about investment in knowledge in period t−1,
thus the Markov process assumption yields
ωjt = E[ωjt|ωjt−1, rjt−1] + ξjt = g(ωjt−1, rjt−1) + ξjt (2.50)
(2.50) shows that the productivity at period t, ωjt can be decomposed into expected pro-
ductivity g(·) and a random shock ξjt. While the expected productivity depends on R&D
expenditure, the innovation in productivity ξjt does not. The term ξjt generally captures
factors that persistently influence productivity such as absorption of techniques, modifica-
tion of production precesses, fluctuations due to changes in labor composition and man-
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agerial ability but, when firms engage in R&D the innovation in productivity also captures
the uncertainties inherent in the knowledge accumulation process such as the chance of
discovery, or the success in implementation. The timing structure behind firms’ behavior
is also emphasized in (2.50), i.e. in period t − 1, when the optimal level of investment in
knowledge rjt−1 is decided, the firm can only form an expectation regarding the impact of
R&D on ωjt, but the actual impact depend on the realization of ξjt that occurs only after
the investment has been completely carried out.
The estimation of an endogenous productivity process is challenging when data on R&D
are not available because the estimation procedures analyzed so far do not apply for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, input prices are invalid instruments because, when the productivity
process is not exogenous, the transitions from current to future productivity are affected
by the choice of the additional unobserved R&D input, whose optimal choice depends on
the prices of all the other inputs. Second, the scalar unobservable assumption necessary for
a structural estimation like OP, LP, or ACF is violated in this context because rjt and ωjt
are both unobservable and recovering the productivity process using capital, investment,
or intermediate input demand may not be possible. Furthermore, even when data on R&D
are available, there may still be problems with identification as noted by Buettener (2005).
DJ estimation procedure relies on R&D data and builds on the LP insight that, since
static inputs like labor and material are chosen once the current productivity realization is
known, they contain useful information about it. More specifically, given the production
function in (2.48), assuming that labor is a static input implies that the optimal demand
for labor is given by:
ljt =
1
1− βl (β0 + ln(βl) + µ+ βkkjt + ωjt − (wjt − pjt)) (2.51)
where µ = lnE[exp(ηjt)] and (wjt− pjt) is the real wage. Solving for ωjt, the inverse labor
demand function is
ωjt = ht(kjt, ljt, (wjt − pjt)) = −β0 − ln(βl)− µ+ (1− βl)ljt − βkkjt + (wjt − pjt) (2.52)
Lagging (2.52) yields ωjt−1 = ht−1(kjt−1, ljt−1, (wjt−1 − pjt−1)) thus, substituting ht−1 for
ωjt−1 into (2.50) and using it in the production function, JD take to the data the following
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estimating equation:
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + g(ht−1(kjt−1, ljt−1, (wjt−1 − pjt−1), rjt−1) + ξjt + ηjt (2.53)
Note that in the above expression kjt, whose value is determined in period t − 1 through
ijt−1 and rjt−1 is uncorrelated with ξjt, but the same is not true for ljt. However, non-linear
functions of the other variables, as well as lagged values of ljt can be used as instruments
for labor.
Applying a non-linear GMM technique, Doraszelski and Jaumandreu estimate (2.53) us-
ing an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing firms during the 1990s. Their findings
confirm the well established empirical pattern that, compated to OLS estimates, the labor
coefficient labor decreases and the capital coefficient considerably increases when control-
ling for exogenous productivity. This result is even stronger when the productivity process
is endogenized through R&D. Moreover, there is evidence of complementarities and increas-
ing return to R&D, but the R&D process shows significant non-linearity and uncertainty.
The returns to R&D are considerably higher than the returns to physical capital and the
expected productivity of firms that engage in R&D is systematically more favorable com-
pared to that of firms not performing R&D. Finally, R&D expenditures are found to be
the primary source of productivity growth in the Spanish manufacturing sector, as firms
investing in R&D contribute 65 to 85 percent to the productivity growth in the industries
with intermediate or highly innovative activities.
2.5 Concluding remark
This survey has demonstrated that, even if production function estimation is challenging
because of the possibility of simultaneity and selection bias, to obtain realistic and reliable
estimates of production function coefficients, is the first step to answering more complex
and interesting economic questions.
Since firms’ responses to changes in the operating environment typically depend on how
these changes affect their productivity, to separate the evolution in productivity from the
variation in input choices, which also react to changes in the environment, requires an
explicit model describing how firms’ optimal choices are made. The appropriateness of
different models and assumptions remains an empirical issue that needs to be addressed in
each specific case, given the environment and the available data.
The literature has suggested a considerable variety of alternatives, nonetheless the com-
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mon message emphasized in all the proposed approaches is that productivity studies must
explicitly take into account the fact that changes in productivity are the main determinant
of firms’ response to the changes being analyzed, therefore, changes in productivity cannot
be ignored in any estimation procedure.
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3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 A structural framework to estimate production function coefficients
My first empirical goal is to obtain estimates of production function parameters. However,
as well documented in the literature, this is not a simple task since, while firms’ productivity
is not directly observable, optimal input decisions are based on it. The fact that differences
in productivity are known to firms when they choose their inputs and, for a given firm,
productivity is usually highly correlated over time generates the classic simultaneity bias.
3.1.1 The empirical model
To address the simultaneity problem I rely on the insight of Olley and Pakes (1996), who
propose to include directly in the estimation a proxy for productivity. This proxy is derived
from a structural dynamic model of firm behavior that allows for firm-specific productivity
differences, characterized by idiosyncratic changes over time, and specifies the information
available to the firms when input decisions are made. Specifically, consider a firm j in
industry i at time t (to simplify notation the industry subscript is omitted) producing
output Qjt according to the production function technology
Qjt = F (Xjt,Kjt, β) exp(ωjt) (3.1)
where Xjt is a set of variable inputs, Kjt is capital stock, and β is a common set of
technology parameters that governs the transformation of inputs to units of output in
industry i. ωjt is a firm-specific, Hicks neutral productivity shock.
Define value added as Yjt = Qjt−Mjt, with Mjt being intermediate inputs such as material
and energy. Allowing for measurement error and for unanticipated shocks to production,
the observed value added is given by Yjtηjt and the value added industry-specific production
function is
yjt = βlljt + βkkjt + βlll
2
jt + βkkk
2
jt + βlklitkjt + ωjt + ηjt (3.2)
where lower cases denote natural logarithms of the variables. Capital is a state variable ac-
cumulated accordingly to the deterministic dynamic investment process kjt = (1−δ)kjt−1+
ijt−1. Note that this particular formulation of the capital accumulation process implies that
period t capital stock was actually determined at time t− 1. On the other hand, labor is
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assumed to be a perfectly variable input decided either at time t, when production takes
place, or at time t− b, after capital but before production decisions occur. The importance
of these assumption regarding the timing of input choices is related to identification and
will become clear shortly. The error in (3.2) is assumed to be additively separable in the
transmitted productivity component ωjt and in the i.i.d. component ηjt. The main differ-
ence between these two components is that the former is assumed to be known by the firm
when making optimal input choices while the latter is not so that ηjt simply represents a
random optimization error. Note also that (3.2) is a translog production function but it
easily allows to recover the Cobb-Douglas specification by dropping the higher order terms
(βlll
2
jt, βkkk
2
jt) and the interaction term (βlkljtkjt).
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the production function coefficients, I directly
control for unobserved productivity shocks, which are potentially correlated with labor and
capital choices, adopting, again, the approach proposed by Olley and Pakes. Specifically, I
use the investment function to proxy for productivity under the assumption that a firm’s
optimal investment demand, ijt = ht(kjt, ωjt), is a strictly increasing function of its current
productivity. The investment demand function contains all current state variables for the
optimizing firm, i.e. its current level of capital and its current productivity. Conversely,
labor does not enter the state space because it is a non-dynamic input and values of ωjt
prior to period t do not enter the state space either because the evolution of ωjt is assumed
to be governed by a first-order Markov process of the form p(ωjt|ωjt−1). Furthermore, the
h function is only indexed by t (and not jt) since variables such as input prices and demand
shifters, which may be also part of the state space, are allowed to vary only across time but
not across firms as it is plausible to assume that firms operate in the same inputs market
and under the same demand conditions. Given that the investment function is strictly
monotonic in ωjt, it can be inverted to obtain
ωjt = h
−1
t (kjt, ijt) (3.3)
Following the same reasoning and maintaining the same assumptions on the evolution
of the productivity process and the static/dynamic nature of the inputs, I also use the
approach suggested by Levinson-Petrin (2003). They observe that investment levels are, in
many cases, zero or very lumpy and propose to control for unobserved productivity using
the intermediate input demand function as a proxy. In this case, if the optimal expenditure
level in intermediates, mjt = ft(kjt, ωjt), is assumed to be a strictly increasing function of
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the current productivity, it can be inverted to generate
ωjt = f
−1
t (kjt,mjt) (3.4)
3.1.2 Estimation procedure
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) show that investment or, alternatively, intermediate input de-
mand can be substituted into the production function as a proxy for the unobserved pro-
ductivity term ωjt, so that the estimating equation in (3.2) becomes
yjt = βlljt + βkkjt + βlll
2
jt + βkkk
2
jt + βlkljtkjt + h
−1
t (kjt, ijt) + ηjt (3.5)
or
yjt = βlljt + βkkjt + βlll
2
jt + βkkk
2
jt + βlkljtkjt + f
−1
t (kjt,mjt) + ηjt (3.6)
The estimation of (3.5) or (3.6) consists of two stages. The first stage serves the purpose
of obtaining an estimate of the expected value added φjt and an estimate of ηjt alternatively
running the following regressions:
yjt = φt(ljt, kjt, ijt) + ηjt (3.7)
or
yjt = φt(ljt, kjt,mjt) + ηjt (3.8)
where in (3.7) φjt = φt(ljt, kjt, ijt) = βlljt +βkkjt +βlll
2
jt +βkkk
2
jt +βlkljtkjt +h
−1
t (kjt, ijt),
while in (3.8) φjt = φt(ljt, kjt,mjt) = βlljt+βkkjt+βlll
2
jt+βkkk
2
jt+βlkljtkjt+f
−1
t (kjt,mjt).
In addition, the functions h−1t in (3.5) and f
−1
t in (3.6), are given by:
h−1t (kjt, ijt) = β¯kkjt + βiijt + β¯kkk
2
jt + βiii
2
jt + βkikjtijt (3.9)
and
f−1t (kjt,mjt) = β¯kkjt + βmmjt + β¯kkk
2
jt + βmmm
2
jt + βkmkjtmjt (3.10)
Note that, due to the specification of (3.9) and (3.10), in the first stage the coefficients
associated with capital and capital squared in (3.5) and (3.6), respectively, are not identi-
fied. These coefficients will be identified only in the second stage of the estimation using
an appropriate set of moment conditions.
Moreover, under the Cobb-Douglas specification, i.e. yjt = βlljt+βkkjt+h
−1
t (kjt, ijt) +ηjt
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with the investment demand, or yjt = βlljt+βkkjt+f
−1
t (kjt,mjt)+ηjt with the intermedi-
ate input demand, the coefficient associated with labor, βl, can be identified and estimated
in the first stage as well.
In the second stage the (remaining) production function coefficients can be obtained
relying on the Markov process assumption and the law of motion for productivity. More
specifically, I model the productivity process non parametrically as a third degree polyno-
mial of lagged productivity in the following way:
ωjt = γ0 + γ1ωjt−1 + γ2ω2jt−1 + γ3ω
3
jt−1 + ξjt (3.11)
Using the estimated φˆjt from the first stage, the value of productivity for any given vector
of β, where β = (βl, βk, βll, βkk, βlk), can be computed as:
ωjt(β) = φˆjt − βlljt − βkkjt − βlll2jt − βkkk2jt − βlkljtkjt (3.12)
By regressing ωjt(β) on its lag ωjt−1(β) it is possible to recover the innovation in produc-
tivity given by ξjt(β). Specifically, denote βZjt = βlljt + βkkjt + βlll
2
jt + βkkk
2
jt + βlkljtkjt,
then the productivity process in (3.14) can simply be rewritten as ωjt(β) = φˆjt− βZjt and
the term ξjt in (3.13) is given by:
ξjt(β) =φˆjt − βZjt − γ0 − γ1(φˆjt−1 − βZjt−1)− (3.13)
γ2(φˆjt−1 − βZjt−1)2 − γ3(φˆjt−1 − βZjt−1)3
Equation (3.31) allows for calculating a ξjt(β) term for every firm and every period which
can be used in a GMM context to form appropriate moments in order to finally obtain
estimates of the production function parameters.
More precisely, for the Cobb-Douglas specification, I carry on the estimate for βl from the
first stage and identify βk using the moment condition on current capital
E[ξjt(β)kjt] = 0 (3.14)
The rationale behind the validity of this moment comes from the assumptions on the timing
of input choices discussed above. Assuming that the optimal level of ljt is chosen at time t,
when also the innovation in productivity is known to the firm, implies that ljt is correlated
with ξjt and the coefficient on labor βl needs to be identified in the first stage. Conversely,
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the optimal level of kjt is assumed to be chosen at time t − 1, thus kjt is not correlated
with ξjt and the moment condition in (3.14) identifies the coefficient on capital βk in the
second stage of the estimation.
Regarding the translog production function I estimate the whole set of coefficients in the
second stage relying on the moment conditions
E
ξjt(β)

ljt−1
kjt
l2jt−1
kjt2
ljt−1kjt

 = 0 (3.15)
These moments exploit the following assumptions on the timing of input choices. Once
again, current capital is assumed to be decided one period ahead therefore, at time t, kjt is
not correlated with the innovation in productivity ξjt. Lagged labor is used to identify the
coefficient on labor if current labor, ljt, is expected to react to shocks to productivity and
hence E[ξjt(β)ljt] is expected to be different from zero. Thus, the moment conditions in
(3.15) identify the whole set of coefficients (βl, βk, βll, βkk, βlk) in the translog production
function. The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are obtained by block-bootstrap
which is a special bootstrap technique designed to maintain the structure of the panel.
Specifically, I bootstrap along the firm dimension, i.e. I randomly sample with replacement
a number of firms equal to the number of firms present in each industry 400 times.
Two remarks regarding the estimation procedure are needed. First, I do not explicitly
model entry and exit. This is because the panel I use is essentially closed given that, when
a firm exited the sample, it was replaced by a similar firm and this new firm was assigned
the same identifier as the exiting one. Consequently, it is not possible to keep track of
entry and exit patterns and focus on selection issues. However, as Griliches and Mairesse
(1998) and Levinson and Petrin (2003) note, the selection correction seems to make little
difference once the simultaneity correction is in place. Second, I observe revenue instead
of physical output, hence I actually estimate ”revenue” production function parameters
deflating the sales with an industry-wide price index. This is an imperfect solution since,
if the unobserved firm-specific output price index substantially differs from the industry
price index, I am actually introducing a price error. Furthermore, if input decisions are
correlated with the price error, the estimated coefficients of the production function may
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be biased downward because, as mentioned in the original contribution by Klette and
Griliches (1996), more inputs will lead to higher output and decrease prices, ceteris paribus.
Nonetheless, this imperfect solution appears to be the best possible solution, given the
limitations in the available data
3.2 A structural approach to derive firm-level markups
My second empirical goal is to derive markup estimates at the firm-level. To achieve this
goal I follow the approach proposed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), which has the
advantage of not depending on the availability of very detailed data. The data require-
ments, indeed, are limited to total expenditure on variable inputs (labor and materials),
capital, investment and output at the firm-level. This approach is fairly direct from an
economic theory perspective, since it relies on standard optimal input demand conditions
that can be obtained from standard cost minimization. Moreover, it is straightforward to
implement empirically, since the estimation is simply based on the insight that the cost
share of factors of production are not equal to their output revenue share when markets are
not perfectly competitive, so that the estimated markups can be interpreted as a measure
of market power. Finally, this approach is flexible as it can be applied to a wide range of
production functions and it is able to correct the markup bias by directly controlling for
the firm-specific unobserved productivity.
To derive an expression for markups consider, once again, a firm j in industry i at
time t (the industry subscript is again omitted for simplicity) producing output Qjt using
variable inputs (X1jt, . . . , X
V
jt), which may include labor, materials, and energy, and capital
Kjt as factors of production, and with productivity level ωjt. This firm aims to minimize
its cost of production by solving the problem
min
Xjt,Kjt
V∑
v=1
PX
v
jt X
v
jt + rjtKjt (3.16)
s.t. Qjt = Qjt(X
1
jt, . . . , X
V
jt ,Kjt, ωjt)
where PX
v
jt denotes the price of any variable input and rjt denotes the price of capital.
The technology constraint takes a very general form and the only restriction imposed on
Qjt(·) is that it is continuous and twice differentiable with respect to its argument. The
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Lagrangian associated with the minimization problem in (3.16) is given by:
L(Xjt,Kjt, λjt) =
V∑
v=1
PX
v
jt X
v
jt + rjtKjt + λjt(Qjt −Qjt(·)) (3.17)
with the first order condition with respect to each variable input being
∂L
∂Xvjt
= PX
v
jt − λjt
∂Qjt(·)
∂Xvjt
= 0 (3.18)
The Lagrange multiplier λjt, in this context, measures the marginal cost of production since
∂L
∂Qjt
= λjt. This is because, formally, λjt represents the shadow value of the constraint,
i.e. the increase in cost generated by a marginal expansion in output.
Rearranging terms, multiplying both sides of (3.18) by Xjt/Qjt, and dividing by λjt yields
∂Qjt(·)
∂Xvjt
Xvjt
Qjt
=
1
λjt
PX
v
jt X
v
jt
Qjt
(3.19)
(3.19) simply states that cost minimization requires the optimal input demand being satis-
fied when a firm equalizes the output elasticity of input Xvjt to
1
λjt
PX
v
jt X
v
jt
Qjt
. Note that, in the
special case of constant marginal cost, given the interpretation of the Lagrange multiplier,
(3.19) implies that, at the optimum a firm equalizes the output elasticity of any variable
input to its cost share.
Defining µjt as the the markup, implies that µjt =
Pjt
λjt
or, in a more compact way,
µjt =
θXvjt
αXvjt
(3.20)
where θXvjt is the output elasticity with respect to the variable input X
v
jt and αXvjt is the
share of Xvjt’s expenditure in total revenue.
As mentioned before, the technology constraint in (3.16) is very general and can easily
encompass different specifications. Assuming that the technology takes the form of the
value added production function in (3.2) (where labor is the only variable input) and
estimating the production function parameters following the procedure illustrated in the
previous section, the estimated output elasticity of labor is given by θˆLjt = βˆl+2βˆlllit+βˆlkkit
under the translog, and by θˆLjt = βˆl under the Cobb-Douglas specification. Additionally,
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the expenditure share is αLjt = exp(ηˆjt)
PLjtLjt
PjtY˜jt
, where Y˜jt is observed value added, given
by Yjt + exp(ηjt), allowing for measurement error. Note that the correction with the error
term ηjt is important to eliminate any variation in the expenditure share that comes from
variation in output not correlated with factor of production choices. Finally, with θˆLjt and
αLjt , the expression for the estimated markup for each firm in each period is derived as:
µˆjt =
θˆLjt
αLjt
(3.21)
(3.21) remarks the rationale behind this approach for estimating markups, i.e. market
power can be detected when the output elasticity of labor does not equalize the labor
expenditure share.
3.3 A simpler dual approach to derive industry-level markups
The computational intensive methodology illustrated above allows for estimating firm-
specific markups using disaggregated micro-level data. Here, I present a more parsimo-
nious approach, that can be applied to more aggregated data, and is suitable to estimate
industry-specific markups, i.e. all firms belonging to the same industry are assumed to
share the same price-cost margin. The purpose of exploring this alternative method is to
have a standard of comparison between a simpler and less demanding (in terms of data
requirements and computational burden) approach and a more structural and onerous one.
The basic idea behind this unsophisticated approach is that, under certain assump-
tions, total factor productivity can be calculated either as the residual of the production
function or, alternatively, as the residual of the dual cost function. However, the correla-
tion between these theoretically equivalent measures is hard to verify empirically. Roeger
(1995) argues that this lack of correlation can be explained by the presence of a positive
markup of prices over marginal costs. In fact, with imperfect competition, the difference
in the growth rate of output and a weighted average of the factor inputs cannot be entirely
attributed to technical change. This is because, if price exceeds marginal cost, the input
shares per unit of output do not sum up to one and are lower, instead, because of the
presence of a positive markup.
Formally, consider an industry i characterized by a linearly homogeneous production func-
tion. The value added for this industry at time t is given by Yit = ΘitF (Lit,Kit) where
Lit is labor, Kit is capital and Θit is an industry- and period-specific shock in production.
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Note that the productivity term Θit can be thought of as including an unanticipated and
random element as well as an element that can be foreseen by all the firms in the industry.
Carrying on the insight of Hall (1988), the decomposition of the Solow residual (SR) into
a pure technology component and a markup component can be formulated as:
SRit = Yˆit − αitLˆit − (1− αit)Kˆit = βit
(
Yˆit − Kˆit
)
+ (1− βit)Θˆit (3.22)
where the hat represents growth rates, PLit and P
Y
it are price of labor (i.e. wage) and
price of output, respectively, and αit =
PLitLit
PYit Yit
is the labor expenditure share in total value
added expressed in growth rates. In this context, market power can be recovered from the
Lerner index βit =
PYit −cit
PYit
= 1 − 1µit , with cit denoting the marginal cost, and µit =
PYit
cit
the price-cost markup. While value added, input factor usage, and input shares can be
easily observed in the data, the Lerner index and the productivity shock cannot. Hence,
the estimation of βit in (3.22) is problematic because (Yˆit − Kˆit) and Θˆit are positively
correlated since optimal input decisions (in this case concerning capital) are made taking
into account the partially known productivity shock. A possible solution to this problem
would require identifying appropriate instruments that are correlated with output, but are
neither a consequence nor a cause of technological innovation yet, as well documented in
the literature, finding such instruments is a difficult task.
To deal with this issue, Roeger derives the dual price-based Solow residual (SPR):
SPRit = αitPˆ
L
it + (1− αit)Rˆit − Pˆ Yit = −βit
(
Pˆ Yit − Rˆit
)
+ (1− βit)Θˆit (3.23)
where Rit represents the rental rate of capital. Subtracting (3.22) from (3.23), the net
Solow residual is given by:
SRit − SPRit =
(
Yˆit + Pˆ
Y
it
)
− αit
(
Lˆit + Pˆ
L
it
)
− (1− αit)
(
Kˆit + Rˆit
)
= βit
[(
Yˆit + Pˆ
Y
it
)
−
(
Kˆit + Rˆit
)]
(3.24)
(3.24) can be further rewritten to obtain a direct measure of the price-cost markup, i.e.(
Yˆit + Pˆ
Y
it
)
−
(
Kˆit + Rˆit
)
= µit
[
αit
((
Lˆit + Pˆ
L
it
)
−
(
Kˆit + Rˆit
))]
(3.25)
Note that (3.25) simply states that the markup captures the difference between the net
change in nominal value added and the net change in nominal labor payments weighted
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by the labor share in value added, where net means that the change in nominal capital
has been netted out from both variables. Also note that the term (1− βit)Θˆit, causing the
endogeneity issue in (3.22) and, potentially, in (3.23), does not appear in (3.25) so that this
equation can be consistently estimated without using instrumental variables. Moreover,
(3.25) provides a way of estimating markups indirectly controlling for (i.e. netting out)
productivity.
From (3.25) it is also clear that markup estimates at the industry-level can be easily
obtained using only aggregated data on the nominal value added (calculated as the nominal
value of sales minus the nominal value of materials), the total labor remuneration in nominal
terms, and the nominal value of capital (calculated as the product between the real capital
stock and the nominal interest rate).
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4 Trade Exposure and Price-Cost Margins
4.1 The Mexican case
From the early 1950s until the early 1980s Mexico2, like many other developing countries,
adopted a growth strategy based on import substitution. Relying on protection measures
against world competition and government intervention in the domestic economy, this
strategy encouraged investment in industry, suppressed agricultural prices and expanded
government enterprises. Between 1960 and 1981 Mexico experienced an average increase of
real GDP of 7 percent per year; even accounting for the high rate of population growth in
Mexico over the that period, this translated into an average increase of GDP per capita of
4 percent per year. During the 1970-1982 period, however, the import substitution policy
began to be less effective as policies of deficit spending and monetary expansion financed by
public sector borrowing from international banks were implemented. As a result, Mexico
experienced rising inflation, which together with a fixed nominal exchange rate, led to
substantial real exchange rate appreciation and growing current account deficit. Despite
the substantial economic imbalances, the Mexican economy continued to expand on an
average growth rate of real GDP of 6.2 percent over 1970-1982.
In 1982 the import substitution policy, and the Mexican economy with it, fell apart.
Faced with a massive public debt owned by foreign banks, sharply rising international
interest rates, and falling oil prices due to the worldwide recession, Mexico could not
meet its debt obligations. The peso collapsed, the government nationalized banks and
implemented strict exchange rate controls and the economy entered a deep recession.
In late 1982, under newly elected President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Mexico embarked
on its first steps on the long road to recovery. During the 1983-85 period, with the financial
support of the International Monetary Fund, the new administration implemented a series
of policies designed to cut the public sector deficit and turn the large trade deficit into a
surplus. These policies included reduction in government expenditures, increases in taxes
and in the prices of public services, elimination of many subsidies and closure of some
public enterprises, enforcement of license requirements for all imports and the abolition of
the exchange controls. Although this program was successful in creating a trade surplus
and in partially lowering inflation, it was not enough to prevent another crises. In late 1985
fiscal discipline began to waver, IMF funding ended, an earthquake in Mexico City caused
2The following data on the Mexican economy as well as the main features of the trade reform are taken
from Kehoe (1995).
43
disruption and imposed significant costs, and the oil prices started on a steep decline that
continued until 1987.
The 1985-87 period was characterized by falling output and accelerating inflation. It
was during this period, however, that Mexico began some of the policy reforms that were
crucial in bringing deficit and inflation rate to acceptable levels and restoring economic
prosperity during the 1987-93 period. Major initiative included privatization of state-
owned companies, deregulation of financial markets, liberalization of foreign investment
regulations and a dramatic re-orientation of trade policy.
The trade policy reforms were perhaps the most striking. In 1985 the process of aper-
tura, openness to foreign trade and investment, began and between 1982 and 1994 Mexico
went from being a relatively closed economy, even for developing countries’ standards, to
be one of the most open in the world. In 1982 tariffs were as high as 100 percent and there
was substantial dispersion in tariff rates. Licenses were required for importing any good
and, as a general rule, foreigners were restricted to no more than 49 percent ownership of
Mexican enterprises. In 1982 import licenses, not tariffs, were Mexico’s most significant
trade barriers. Starting in late 1983 quantitative restrictions were replaced with tariffs.
The portion of tariff items subject to license requirements fell from 100 percent in 1983 to
65 percent in 1984 and reached 10 percent in 1985. By 1992 it was just 2 percent. Even
so, the portion of the value of imports subject to license requirements fell more slowly:
from 100 percent in 1983 to 83 percent in 1984, to 35 percent in 1985, to 11 percent in
1992. As import licenses were replaced by tariffs as the major tool of trade policy, average
tariffs initially rose and then fell. The average tariff went from 23.2 percent in 1983 to 25.4
percent in 1985, to 13.1 in 1992. The trade-weighted average tariff went from 8.0 percent
in 1983 to 13.3 percent in 1985, to 11.1 percent in 1992.
Equally effective with the change in average tariff rates was the simplification of the tar-
iff schedule. These measures were major steps in making the Mexican trade policy less
protective and more transparent. They were accompanied by a number of other support-
ing policies: in 1986 Mexico acceded the GATT adopting the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System, the Foreign Trade Law and the GATT Anti-Dumping
Code. In short, in about five years Mexico dramatically liberalized its trade regime. The
liberalization process was almost complete by the end of 1987, although the impact on
the flow of imports was softened by real devaluations. The reforms helped to promote
exports. In terms of both import penetration and export rates, the manufacturing sector
was substantially open as a consequence.
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4.2 Relating markups and measures of trade liberalization
Prior to the consistent liberalization started in 1983, trade accounted for a small share
of manufacturing production in most Mexican industries. Both the ratio of imports over
domestic consumption and the ratio of exports over domestic production were below 10
percent. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the rapid and dramatic process of foreign trade
and investment liberalization, in merely a decade Mexico went from being a relatively closed
economy, even for developing countries’ standards, to be one of the most open in world.
In order to investigate whether this outward-looking reform generated import discipline I
relay on two simple models that allow for quantifying the impact of trade liberalization on
the price-cost margins. The first model is a variant of Domowitz, Hubbard and Peterson
(1986) and it is suitable for a industry-level analysis on the markups. Consider the relation:
µit = f (Hit, TRADEit, Hit ∗ TRADEit,KQit, Ii, Tt) (4.1)
where the explanatory variables include a measure of industry structure, the Herfindahl in-
dex Hit, a measure of trade liberalization, the industry-level capital-output ratio KQit, as
well as industry Ii and time Tt controls. Regarding the measure of trade exposure I alterna-
tively use the share of total industrial output falling into commodity categories subject to
import licenses (QUOTAit), and the production-weighted official tariff rate (TARIFFit).
When the industry dummies are not included, most of the variation occurs across indus-
tries and the Herfindahl index and the capital-output ratio should identify variations in
technology and the degree of competition among domestic producers. If a pro-competitive
effect of trade exposure exists, it should manifest as a negative correlation between mea-
sures of trade liberalization and markups. Moreover, if highly-concentrated industries do
not operate under perfect competition, they should be relatively more sensitive to foreign
competition, therefore the interaction term between the Herfindahl index and the trade
indicator should reflect the same negative relation between trade openness and price-cost
margins.
With panel data it is possible to further control for persistent differences across industries
in technology and market structure by including industry dummy variables. In this case,
the estimated coefficient reflect only temporal variation in the data and, since measures of
trade policy change through time, price-cost margins regressions including industry dum-
mies are better suited to capture the disciplining effect of trade liberalization.
The second model, proposed by Schmalensee (1985), aims to explain the extent of com-
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petition within a given industry by studying firm-level margins. The rationale behind this
second exercise is to detect whether cross-firm variations are due to industry-wide effects
or to firm-specific market shares. In general, more efficient firms should be larger and have
higher profits, therefore a positive relation between market shares and price-cost margins
is usually expected and it is not necessarily an indication of market power, as emphasized
by Demsetz (1973) in his famous critique. However, if the degree of market power varies
across industries, industry dummies should capture this source of difference in firm-level
profitability. If industry dummies are not significantly different across industries, the ev-
idence suggests absence of heterogeneity in market power. For the purpose of verifying
the effect of trade liberalization on profitability at the firm level consider the following
specification:
µjit = f
(
Sjit, S
2
jit, TRADEit, Sjit ∗ TRADEit,KQjit,KQ2jit, Ii, Tt
)
(4.2)
where the price-cost margin µjit of firm j in industry i in year t depends on its share of
output in total domestic manufacturing production, Sjit and S
2
jit, on the capital-output
ratio KQjit, on an industry-specific measure of trade exposure, TRADEit, as well as
industry and year dummy variables.
4.3 Relating markups and export status
The two previous models relate markups with trade exposure using trade indicators that
mainly capture the extent of import liberalization. In fact, both the quota coverage and the
average tariff rate measure protective restrictions on imports. A number of recent models of
international trade, however, emphasize the implications of trade openness, productivity
and profitability for exporters. More specifically, these models generate the result that
more productive firms are more profitable because they can charge higher markups, the
higher profitability allows those firms to pay an export entry cost and become exporters,
thus exporters have usually higher markups.
In the literature two main reasons for this positive relation between markups and firm’s
export status have been identified. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), as well
as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) attribute the source of the markup premium for exporters
to differences in productivity. Both contributions essentially predict that exporters will
charge higher markups because they are more productive than their domestic rivals and
this productivity wedge allows them to be more profitable and more competitive. On the
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other hand, Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) explore the
role of quality differences between exporters and non exporters assuming that if exporters
produce higher quality goods while using higher quality inputs, they can charge higher
markups, all things equal.
Given that with the structural approach I can estimate firm-level markups, I can easily
relate a firm’s markup to its export status in a regression framework as follows:
ln(µjt) = ψ0 + ψ1Ejt + zjtρ+ εjt (4.3)
where µjt is the markup for firm j at time t and Ejt is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one when firm j is an exporter. Thus, the coefficient associated with this dummy,
ψ1, measures the percentage markup premium for exporters. In addition, zjt is a set of
variables including capital and labor use that control for differences in size and factor
intensity, as well as year- and industry-specific dummy variables that control for aggregate
trends in markups. The vector ρ collects the coefficients associated with the whole set of
controls.
After obtaining an estimate for ψ1 it is possible to recover the level markup difference,
denoted as µE , by calculating the percentage difference with respect to the constant term
ψ0, which captures the markup average for domestic firms. Specifically, µE = ψ1 exp(ψ0).
A positive and significant µE would imply that there is in fact a markup premium for
exporters with respect to the domestic producers.
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5 Data
My entire analysis is conducted using plant-level panel data collected through the Mexico’s
Annual Industrial Survey INEGI. These data were made available by Mexico’s Secretary
of Commerce and Industrial Development SECOFI, (now Secretariat of Economy) and
includes a sample of active Mexican manufacturing plants during the period 1984-1990.
For a typical industry, the sample is representative of about 80 percent of the total output
in that industry therefore, even if the smallest plants were excluded, the sample can be
considered fairly representative. Note that, because of the way the data are reported, it is
not possible to identify which plants belong to the same firm. Therefore, even if there are
certainly multi-plant firms in the sample, I formally treat a plant as a firm and do not try
to capture the extent to which multi-plant firms may have a different strategic production
behavior due to their multi-plant nature. For this reason the words ”firm” and ”plant” are
used interchangeably as, in this dataset, they are essentially the same. Furthermore, as
mentioned before, when a firm exited the sample, it was replaced with a firm with similar
production characteristics and the new firm was assigned the same identifier as the exiting
one. Thus the panel can be considered essentially closed as it is not possible to keep track of
entry and exit patterns. The panel is however unbalanced since a (marginally) decreasing
number of firms is included in the sample over the years.
For each plant in each year it is possible to observe data on value of production, revenue,
input expenditure, labor remunerations,value of fixed capital, investment, inventories, and
input costs. Each plant can be traced and uniquely identified over time using a combina-
tion of industry (RAMA), class (CLASE) and plant (FOLIO) identity codes. The dataset
also contains price indices at the industry level for output and intermediate inputs, and
sector-wide deflators for machinery and equipments, buildings and land. Moreover, the
dataset contains detailed information about imports, exports, and commercial policy fea-
tures like coverage of import license and tariff rates at the industry level. This information
is particularly useful to describe the Mexican trade liberalization process and to verify its
effects on the price-cost margins.
5.1 Data preparation: relevant variables and sample selection criteria
The original sample consisted of 22,526 observations on 3,218 plants during the period
1984-1990. All the variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 1, the monetary
variables were converted to millions of 1980 Mexican pesos using specific deflators.
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Table 1: Variables from the original dataset used in the analysis
Variable Description
Labor force
TOTREMUN1 total labor remunerations
TOHHOM1 total hours worked
TOPEOC total employment
Inputs costs
TOTMASUM5 total material cost
GTRENALQ1 rent and leasing costs
VAENELCN6 value of electricity consumed
GASTMAQU1 cost of subcontractors
Value of output
VALPROEL2 value of output
Revenue
INSERMAQ1 income from subcontracting
Fixed capital
V684 machinery and equipment valued at replacement cost
V924 machinery and equipment produced for own use
V693 construction and installation valued at replacement cost
V933 construction and install assets produced for own use
V701 land valued at replacement cost
V717 transportation equipment valued at replacement cost
V947 transportation equipment assets produced for own use
V721 other assets valued at replacement cost
V954 other asset produced for own use
Trade indicators
TAI630 average tariff on input (June 30)
TAI1230 average tariff on input (Dec. 30)
TAQ630 average tariff on output (June 30)
TAQ1230 average tariff on output (Dec. 30)
LCI630 license coverage on input (June 30)
LCI1230 license coverage on input (Dec. 30)
LCQ630 license coverage on output (June 30)
LCQ1230 license coverage on output (Dec. 30)
Price indices
1PM wholesale price index
2PPP producer price index
3PKE construction price index
4PK machinery price index
5PMP1 raw materials price index
6PEMP electricity price index
7PKT transportation price index
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In addition, I use some of the original variables present in the dataset to construct
new variables useful for the analysis. These variables, their description and the calculation
details are reported in Table 2.
First, the expenditure in intermediates was calculated without taking into account in-
ventories. This choice was dictated by the fact that in 1985 the variables characterizing
inventories presented many missing observation thus, following one of the sample selection
criteria (described in detail below) of withdrawing incomplete series, to consider inventories
would have caused the elimination of half of the plants from the analysis.
Second, total capital stock for each plant was calculated as the sum of replacement cost of
capital and the capitalized value of the rents with a 10 percent discount rate.
Third, the variables involved in the calculation of the value added and the value added
itself were corrected in order to account for the measurement error in the intermediate in-
puts expenditure for the maquiladoras3. Specifically, the value added was corrected adding
the income from subcontracting and subtracting the cost of subcontractors. The gross
value of output, which suffers from the same bias, was corrected under the assumption
that the ratio between value added and output and between primary materials and to-
tal inputs are constant through time and among plants running the following regression4:
CORGVO=GVO+(b((INSERMAQ/PM)-(GASTMAQU/PM))). The value of the b5 pa-
rameter used in the correction was estimated at a two-digit national accounts classification
level (RAMA) using only the plants that did not conduct maquila activities. Finally, the
corrected value of expenditure in intermediates was simply calculated by subtracting the
corrected value added from the corrected value of gross output.
Around 20 percent of the original observations were eliminated discarding negative,
zero, and missing values of the following variables: total employment, total hours worked,
capital stock, gross value of output, corrected gross value of output, value added, corrected
value added, intermediates, corrected intermediates, labor remunerations. This process
ended up with the elimination of 4,234 observations. Among the 18,292 observations left,
other 4,924 were eliminated dropping the incomplete series, i.e. plants that were discarded
3The maquiladora is a firm-concept very diffused in Mexico.Maquiladoras are manufacturing firms that
are allowed to import materials and equipment on a duty-free and tariff-free basis for assembling of manu-
facturing and then sell the assembled or manufactures products to the domestic firm which commissioned
the maquila service or re-export the products outside the Mexican border. The maquiladoras generate mea-
surement error because the Mexican accounting system attributes to the firm that order the subcontracting
service the expenditure in intermediates actually used by the subcontractor.
4See Table 2 for a detailed description of the variables involved in this regression.
5The average value of b is 1.47 with standard deviation 0.12.
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Table 2: Variables constructed
Variable Description Calculation
GVO Gross value of output
GVO=(VALPROEL/PPP)+(V92/PKM)
+(V93/PKE)+(V94/PKT)+(V95/PKM)
INT Intermediates INT=(TOTMASUM/PMP1)+(VAENELCN/PEMP)
VA Value added VA=GVO-INT
CORVA Corrected value added
CORVA=VA+(INSERMAQ/PM)
-(GASTMAQU/PM)
CORGVO Corrected gross value of output
CORGVO=GVO+(b*((INSERMAQ/PM)
-(GASTMAQU/PM)))
CORINT Corrected intermediates CORINT=CORGVO-CORVA
TRCK Total replacement cost of capital
TRCK=(V68/PKM)+(V69/PKE)+(V70/PM)
+(V71/PKT)+(V72/PM)
KSTOCK Capital stock KSTOCK=TRCK+((GTRENALQ/PM)/0.10)
INVEST Investment INVEST=KSTOCKt − 0.9∗KSTOCKt−1
TLPM Deflated total labor remunerations TLPM=TOTREMUN/PM
TLPMPH Labor remunerations per hour TLPMPH=TLPM/TOHHOM
for at least one year because of one or more of the above reasons were completely eliminated
from the sample. The final sample used in the analysis contained 13,368 observations on
2,088 plants. Moreover, in order to carry on the structural production function estimation
using the investment as a proxy for productivity, 2,092 observations were further dropped in
order to create the investment series. Finally, two sectors, Tobacco and Nonferrous metals,
were dropped because the extremely low number of plants left after the sample selection
was not adequate to perform a meaningful empirical analysis in those two industries.
5.2 Sample characteristics
Table 3 reports in detail the industrial classification codes aggregated into each sector, the
average number of plants in each sector as well as some other characteristics that describe
the relative importance of each sector in the total manufacturing output and the openness
to trade. As shown in Table 3 there is substantial heterogeneity in all these characteristics
among the Mexican manufacturing industries.
Table 4 summarizes the data by presenting the number of plants and various indicators
of plant size pooling all the manufacturing plants during the period 1985-1990. Except for
1986, average plant growth is positive whether measured by gross output, value added, or
total employment and it is particularly high in the last 2 years included in the sample.
Average capital stock per plant decreases from 1985 to 1986 probably as a consequence
of the physical destruction caused by the earthquake of 1985 and the low level of net
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Table 3: Industry-specific indicators
# of Share of Share of Share of % of plants
Rama Sector Industry plants output imports exports exporting
11-19 1 Food 226 11.66 7.24 3.09 0.20
20-22 2 Beverages 108 8.42 2.59 2.64 0.22
23 3 Tobacco 6 1.35 2.58 0.22 0.10
24-26 4 Textiles 103 2.25 10.00 8.17 0.24
27 5 Clothing and Apparel 81 0.82 19.22 2.29 0.10
28 6 Leather and Footwear 19 0.18 1.62 58.00 0.38
29-30 7 Wood and Furniture 61 0.64 3.42 5.25 0.13
31-32 8 Pulp and Paper 117 4.80 15.22 1.82 0.13
33-40 9 Chemicals 277 15.72 12.54 11.27 0.42
41-42 10 Plastic and Rubber 159 3.21 14.54 4.51 0.21
43 11 Glass 22 3.07 6.90 15.73 0.62
44 12 Cement 27 2.71 2.05 9.06 0.39
45 13 Nonmetal Minerals 95 1.22 9.68 3.01 0.13
46 14 Iron and Steel 73 10.58 3.10 4.88 0.24
47 15 Nonferrous Metals 6 3.68 2.77 48.68 0.51
48-50 16 Metal Products 106 2.87 14.34 8.80 0.32
51 17 Nonelectrical Machinery 116 1.85 28.80 26.14 0.29
52 -55 18 Electrical Machinery 109 5.49 20.52 8.60 0.41
56-58 19 Transport Equipment 116 19.06 19.54 39.94 0.44
59 20 Other Manufacturing 46 0.54 16.92 4.14 0.20
Note: The share of output is reported as average over the sample period. The shares of imports and exports
are calculated as shares of total sectoral imports and exports, respectively, over sectoral output and are re-
ported as averages over the sample period.
investment during the recession of 1986. Its upward trend after 1987 is consistent with
the recovery of the economy and the exit from the sample of small firms, which occurs
mainly in 1989-1990. Capital productivity is characterized by ups and downs during the
entire period and this may reflect underutilization of capacity and delays in replacing old
equipment. Finally, investment follows also a very irregular pattern with sharp drops in
1986 and 1988 which are likely picking up, again, the adverse effects of the earthquake and
the recession. Additional variables that are used in the regression models and further help
to characterize the Mexican manufacturing environment are reported in Table 6 at the end
of the section.
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Table 4: Production characteristics
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Numbers of Plants 1,949 1,972 1,953 1,919 1,873 1,614
Gross Value of Outputa 465.01 439.07 453.21 473.80 554.19 619.88
Value Addedb 415.56 243.88 247.99 259.75 304.36 361.79
∆ Gross Value of Outputc 7.81 6.66 4.76 21.27 15.09
∆ Value Addedd -2.20 53.45 98.89 61.86 42.65
Capital Stocke 3.14 2.92 2.99 2.94 3.05 3.22
Capital Productivityf 4.59 4.70 4.74 4.35 4.56 4.56
Investmentg 24.94 13.38 37.03 19.17 36.64 36.53
Total Employment 369.29 348.28 343.33 350.20 802.02 409.50
∆ Total Employment h 7.64 1.62 2.40 17.82 44.55
Note: aIn millions of 1980 pesos; bIn millions of 1980 pesos; cPercentage; dPercentage; eIn millions
of 1980 pesos; fAverage plant-level gross value of output/capital stock; gIn millions of 1980 pesos;
hPercentage.
5.3 Trade statistics
The trade data on imports and exports, used to calculate the statistics at the industry level
reported in the last three columns of Table 3, came from the Commodity Trade database
of the United Nations Statistical Office, which provides information at the four-digit level
ISIC classification and categorized products by end of use. These data were merged with
the Mexico’s Annual Industrial Survey, which on the other hand categorized products by
production technology, trying to achieve a reasonable match relying on detailed product
codes available in the industrial survey. Also since the trade data are reported in dollars,
they were first converted into 1980 dollars and then into pesos using the 1980 exchange
rate in order to render the figures comparable removing the exchange rate fluctuations.
In addition, the data on commercial policies were provided by the SECOFI and were
already harmonized with the classification scheme of the industrial census. These data,
summarized by industry and time sub-periods in Table 5, clearly demonstrate that most
of the changes in commercial policy took place between 1985 and 1988.
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Table 5: Average annual change in trade protection
∆ Import coverage ∆ Average tariff rate
1985-1988 1988-1990 1985-1988 1988-1990
Food -24.34 -11.46 -22.97 -5.97
Beverages -33.09 -29.63 -34.73 -7.33
Tobacco 3.17 -0.17 -26.57 -8.46
Textiles -49.56 -25.70 -24.89 -12.37
Clothing and Apparel -41.60 -47.83 -25.16 -11.93
Leather and Footwear -56.32 -40.18 -25.44 -11.01
Wood and Furniture -71.98 -31.37 -25.50 -12.99
Pulp and Paper -53.11 -45.68 -33.80 -10.98
Chemicals -53.08 -23.34 -21.31 -7.23
Plastic and Rubber -70.13 -30.21 -21.95 -12.12
Glass -48.72 -4.71 -34.00 -11.14
Cement -25.36 -0.81 -20.27 -6.93
Nonmetal Minerals -50.98 -8.57 -24.12 -10.22
Iron and Steel -42.95 -4.92 -18.71 0.15
Nonferrous Metals -51.64 -6.68 -23.51 -8.04
Metal Products -66.38 -19.88 -27.73 -9.74
Nonelectrical Machinery -44.07 -14.83 -18.70 -3.20
Electrical Machinery -72.64 -40.66 -22.54 -10.03
Transport Equipment -44.31 -36.09 -24.39 -7.16
Other Manufacturing -47.78 -17.44 -23.73 -9.60
Note: The change is expressed in percentage.
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6 Production Function Estimation Results
In this section I exploit the structural framework described in Section 3.1 to estimate pro-
duction function parameters controlling for endogenous productivity for eighteen Mexican
manufacturing sectors. I estimate several models under different production technology
specifications (Cobb-Douglas and translog) with both the Olley and Pakes and Levinson
and Petrin approaches. The estimation results suggest that the Cobb-Douglas specification
with the investment function used as a proxy for productivity (Olley and Pakes method)
is the most adequate to fit the data, therefore I provide all the main results on production
function parameters and productivity adopting this specification. At the end of the section
I report robustness check results obtained with alternative models.
6.1 Production function parameters
I begin by presenting the production function estimates for the whole sample comparing
the structural estimation results with the ones obtained using more standard OLS and fixed
effects estimation techniques. I then test whether there is statistically significant evidence
that the production function coefficients change during the period considered.
6.1.1 Comparing different estimators
The last two columns of Table 7 report the results obtained estimating a Cobb-Douglas
production function using the investment as a proxy for productivity (Olley and Pakes
approach). Specifically, in the first stage the Cobb-Douglas version of equation (3.7), i.e.
yjt = βlljt + βkkjt + h
−1
t (kjt, ijt) + ηjt
= φt(ljt, kjt, ijt) + ηjt (6.1)
is estimated with OLS. The results of the first stage estimation, i.e. φˆjt and ηˆjt, are carried
through the second stage where the residual ξjt of the productivity process from equation
(3.11) is again obtained by OLS. Finally, equation (3.13) is estimated by GMM exploiting
the moment condition on capital in (3.14). Note that, since the coefficient on labor βl is
identified and estimated in the first stage, I rely on one moment condition to identify the
only remaining parameter, βk, in the second stage. Thus, the system is just identified and
the identity matrix is the optimal weighting matrix used in the GMM objective function.
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In almost all sectors, with the exception of Food (1) and Glass (11), the coefficient associ-
ated with labor is significant and ranges from 0.15 in Chemicals (9) to 0.96 in Leather and
Footwear (6). The coefficient on capital, on the other hand, is significant for only twelve
sectors and ranges from 0.36 in Plastic and Rubber (10) to 0.74 in Nonelectrical machinery
(17). As expected, there are significant differences in the production function parameters,
thus in technology, across sectors. In particular, some sectors like Clothing and Apparel
(5), and Plastic and Rubber (10) are more labor intensive, while other sectors like Pulp and
Paper (8), Chemicals (9), and Transportation equipment (19) are more capital intensive.
Table 7: Estimates of production function coefficient
under different estimation methodologies
OLS FE Structural
Industry βl βk βl βk βl βk
1 0.7407∗∗∗ 0.2243∗∗∗ 0.5601∗∗∗ 0.3161∗∗∗ 0.0537 0.5749∗∗
2 0.5873∗∗∗ 0.3654∗∗∗ 0.2402∗∗∗ 0.2492∗∗∗ 0.2751∗∗ 0.6385∗∗
4 0.7115∗∗∗ 0.1243∗∗∗ 0.4717∗∗∗ 0.0845 0.4914∗∗ 0.0833
5 0.7949∗∗∗ 0.2067∗∗∗ 0.6128∗∗∗ 0.0364 0.5967∗∗ 0.2334
6 0.8408∗∗∗ 0.2353∗∗∗ 0.5624∗∗∗ 0.2017∗∗ 0.9606∗∗ 0.0086
7 0.7293∗∗∗ 0.2424∗∗∗ 0.5486∗∗∗ 0.3465∗∗∗ 0.4192∗∗ 0.0615
8 0.6923∗∗∗ 0.3273∗∗∗ 0.2629∗∗∗ 0.6271∗∗∗ 0.2320∗∗ 0.5934∗∗
9 0.6454∗∗∗ 0.3251∗∗∗ 0.1343∗∗∗ 0.1500∗∗∗ 0.1545∗∗ 0.6202∗∗
10 0.7943∗∗∗ 0.2525∗∗∗ 0.5239∗∗∗ 0.1128∗∗ 0.5108∗∗ 0.3617∗∗
11 0.7291∗∗∗ 0.1906∗∗∗ 0.9015∗∗∗ 0.3534∗∗∗ 0.0475 0.6243∗∗
12 0.8219∗∗∗ 0.1667∗∗∗ 0.4523∗∗∗ -0.0043 0.4852∗∗ 0.8142
13 0.8143∗∗∗ 0.1804∗∗∗ 0.5834∗∗∗ 0.2179∗∗∗ 0.3992∗∗ 0.3970∗∗
14 0.8039∗∗∗ 0.2285∗∗∗ 0.5298∗∗∗ 0.2009∗∗∗ 0.2622∗∗ 0.4180∗∗
16 0.7238∗∗∗ 0.3396∗∗∗ 0.4642∗∗∗ 0.3298∗∗∗ 0.3432∗∗ 0.5092∗∗
17 0.7454∗∗∗ 0.2758∗∗∗ 0.6412∗∗∗ 0.2909∗∗∗ 0.4699∗∗ 0.7388∗∗
18 0.9131∗∗∗ 0.1723∗∗∗ 0.7183∗∗∗ 0.0440 0.2678∗∗ 0.6330∗∗
19 0.6379∗∗∗ 0.4406∗∗∗ 0.3661∗∗∗ 0.3624∗∗∗ 0.3099∗∗ 0.7342∗∗
20 0.9414∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.4884∗∗∗ 0.0369 0.3188∗∗ 0.1178
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01). For the structural estima-
tion the standard errors are obtained by block-bootstrap.
The comparison between the results from the structural estimations and those obtained
with a simple OLS regression yields a well established empirical evidence. First, the coef-
ficients on labor and capital are highly statistically significant across all sectors. Second,
focusing only on the coefficients that are significant in the structural estimation, the OLS
coefficient on labor is always bigger while the coefficient on capital is always smaller than
its structural counterpart. This pattern is well documented in the literature and is deter-
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mined by the correlation structure between the transmitted productivity shock and the
production inputs. More precisely, the variable input labor is supposed to be positively
correlated with the unobserved productivity, thus the OLS coefficient on labor is likely to
be biased upward. On the other hand, if current capital is not correlated with the current
productivity shock, as it is decided one period ahead, or if capital is much less weakly
correlated with productivity than labor, the OLS estimate on capital is likely to be biased
downward.
Finally, looking at the estimates obtained using plant-level fixed effects (third and fourth
column of Table 7), it is clear that, at least for labor, this approach partially mitigates
the bias discussed above, i.e. the fixed effect coefficient on labor is always significant and
smaller than the OLS one. However, the estimation of the capital parameter under fixed
effects appears more problematic with some insignificant values and an unclear pattern
with respect to the magnitude of the coefficient, which is higher than its OLS counterpart
in some cases but smaller in some other cases. Nonetheless, the fixed effects estimates
still remain higher for labor and lower for capital than those obtained with the structural
approach. This is because the former is just an indirect way of controlling for unobserved
productivity, whereas the latter fully accounts for the transitory productivity shock.
With Cobb-Douglas technology, the production function coefficients represent the elas-
ticity of output with respect to the inputs and their sum can be interpreted as returns to
scale. Table 8 reports the estimated returns to scale, i.e. βl + βk. With OLS in most of
the industries the sum of the two coefficients is very close to one but the constant returns
to scale hypothesis is statistically verified only for half of the industries. The within esti-
mator (plant-level fixed effects) delivers returns to scale that are in general below one and
overall lower than in the OLS case. However, for fourteen industries constant returns to
scale are statistically verified. Finally, the returns to scale estimated with the structural
procedure are mostly in between the OLS and FE results and, again, in thirteen out of
eighteen industries the constant returns to scale hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Since the structural approach, and to some extent also the FE, should deliver more
credible estimates as they control (directly or indirectly) for productivity shocks, the em-
pirical evidence seems to support the presence of constant returns to scale in the majority
of the Mexican manufacturing industries.
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Table 8: Returns to scale
under different estimation methodologies
OLS FE Structural
Industry βl + βk βl + βk βl + βk
1 0.9650 0.8762 0.6286∗∗
2 0.9527∗∗ 0.4894∗∗ 0.9136∗∗
4 0.8358∗∗ 0.5562∗∗ 0.5747
5 1.0016 0.6492∗∗ 0.8301∗∗
6 1.0761∗∗ 0.7641∗∗ 0.9692∗∗
7 0.9717 0.8951 0.4807∗∗
8 1.0196 0.8900∗∗ 0.8254
9 0.9705∗∗ 0.2843∗∗ 0.7747
10 1.0468∗∗ 0.6367∗∗ 0.8725
11 0.9197∗∗ 1.2549 0.6718∗∗
12 0.9886 0.4566∗∗ 1.2994∗∗
13 0.9947 0.8013∗∗ 0.7962∗∗
14 1.0324 0.7307∗∗ 0.6802
16 1.0634∗∗ 0.7940∗∗ 0.8524∗∗
17 1.0212 0.9321 1.2087∗∗
18 1.0854∗∗ 0.7623∗∗ 0.9008∗∗
19 1.0785∗∗ 0.7285∗∗ 1.0441∗∗
20 1.0297 0.5253∗∗ 0.4366∗∗
Note: The stars indicate that the constant returns to
scale hypothesis H0 : βl +βk = 1 cannot be rejected at
a 5 percent significance level.
6.1.2 Testing for a structural change in the production function parameters
In order to verify whether the trade liberalization process generated factor reallocation
phenomena across the Mexican manufacturing industries by modifying the factor intensity,
I re-estimate the structural model dividing the sample into two sub-periods, the first from
1985 to 1987 and the second from 1988 to 1990. This choice is dictated by the fact that
in the first three years (1985-1987) the most dramatic reforms took place, while the last
three years (1988-1990) can be mainly considered a consolidation period. In order to carry
on the test I modify (6.1) and (3.11) in the following way:
yjt =βlljt + β˜lDtljt + βkkjt + β˜kDtkjt + β¯kkjt +
˜¯βkDtkjt + βiijt + β˜iDtijt
+ βkkk
2
jt + β˜kkDtk
2
jt + βiii
2
jt + β˜iiDti
2
jt + βkikjtijt + β˜kiDtkjtijt + ηjt (6.2)
ωjt =γ0 + γ¯0Dt + γ1ωjt−1 + γ2ω2jt−1 + γ3ω
3
jt−1 + ξjt (6.3)
59
where Dt is a dummy variable taking the value of one from 1988 on and zero otherwise.
Note that in (6.3) only the constant, i.e. the average productivity, is allowed to possibly
change between the two sub-periods. The intuition behind (6.2) is simply that, if β˜l and
β˜k are significantly different from zero there is evidence of a structural change in the
production function parameters.
Table 9: Production function coefficients estimates
for the sample divided in two sub-periods
1985-1987 1988-1990
Industry βl βk βl + β˜l βk + β˜k
1 0.0355 0.0002 0.0898 1.9850
2 0.1994∗∗ 0.6455 0.3573∗∗ 0.5397
4 0.4175∗∗ 0.2257 0.5968∗∗ 0.1530
5 0.5314∗∗ 0.0236 0.6527 0.3806
6 0.9343∗∗ 0.0000 0.9617 0.3746
7 0.4317∗∗ 0.2614 0.4083 0.5654
8 0.2109∗∗ 0.6516 0.2500 0.5409
9 0.0815∗∗ 0.6566∗∗ 0.2214∗∗ 0.5900
10 0.4031∗∗ 0.4216 0.6390∗∗ 0.3083
11 -0.0091 0.6738∗∗ 0.0415 2.0660
12 0.4614∗∗ 0.4091 0.5405 0.9828
13 0.3372∗∗ 0.5547 0.4672∗∗ 0.1800
14 0.2578∗∗ 0.5190 0.2643 0.1855
16 0.3263∗∗ 0.4570 0.3391 0.5750
17 0.4652∗∗ 0.2690 0.4961 1.2480
18 0.2274∗∗ 0.5754∗∗ 0.3053 0.6739
19 0.3630∗∗ 0.6670 0.2577 0.8071
20 0.2593∗∗ 1.3320∗∗ 0.4975 0.0154
Note: In the first two columns, the stars indicate that zero is not
contained in the 95 percent confidence interval obtained by block-
bootstrapping the sample. In the last two columns, the stars indi-
cate that the coefficient is significantly different between the first
and the second sub-period.
Table 9 shows that, reasonably, in almost all the cases the estimated coefficients for
the two sub-periods can be considered as an upper and lower bound for the coefficients
estimated using the whole sample (reported in the last two columns of Table 7). However,
the first two columns of Table 8 demonstrate that, especially for the capital coefficient, the
division of the sample compromises the significance of the estimates. Moreover, regarding
capital, the coefficient associated with dummy variable is never significant meaning that
there is no evidence that the capital parameter changed in the second part of the sample. As
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for labor, a significant structural change occurs after 1987 for just five industries: Beverages
(2), Textiles (4), Chemicals (9), Plastic and Rubber (10), and Nonmetal minerals (13),
with the labor coefficient always increasing in the second sub-period. Nonetheless, since
only in the Chemicals industry the capital coefficient is significant in the first sub-period
and does not change between the two sub-periods, I conclude that, overall, the factor
intensity remained fairly constant during the trade liberalization process for the majority
of the industries with the exception of the Chemicals sector which became more labor-
intensive. The coefficient associated with the dummy variable in (6.3), not reported here,
is insignificant in every industry suggesting that the average productivity did not change
from the first sub-period to the second.
6.2 Productivity analysis
The structural framework illustrated in Section 3.1 is suitable to obtain a characterization
of the technology in each industry through the production function coefficients as well
as an estimate of the productivity process for each firm in each year. Specifically, with
a Cobb-Douglas technology, the productivity process can be recovered, after estimating
βl and βk, as ωˆjt = φˆjt − βˆlljt − βˆkkjt. Furthermore, recall that the first-order Markov
productivity process is modeled as a third degree polynomial in lagged productivity of the
form: ωjt = γ0 + γ1ωjt−1 + γ2ω2jt−1 + γ3ω
3
jt−1 + ξjt.
The empirical evidence suggests that, since for almost all the industries the γ0, γ2,
and γ3 coefficients are statistically insignificant, the productivity process can be actually
approximated by the AR(1) process ωjt = γ1ωjt−1+ξjt. Therefore, the current productivity
depends only linearly on the value of the previous productivity. Moreover, the γ1 coefficient
is estimated to be always below one (except for the Cement industry (12)) meaning that
the productivity process is stationary. Figure 1 depicts the productivity process for four
industries chosen for illustrative purposes.
For two of those four industries, Figure 2 shows the smoothed plots for capital and
investment. Specifically, in each panel the vertical axis measures the estimated productivity
shock, while the horizontal axis running left measures investment levels and the horizontal
axis running right measures capital usage. The structural estimation procedure is based on
a crucial monotonicity assumption regarding productivity and investment, i.e. conditioning
on any observed levels of capital usage the investment level should increase in productivity.
As demonstrated in Figure 2 this monotonicity condition seems to hold.
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Figure 1: Productivity process
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The ability of obtaining a direct estimate of the productivity process allows me to
analyze the growth in productivity for each firm from year to year. In fact, knowing ωjt,
the growth in productivity can be easily calculated as ∆ωjt = ωjt−ωjt−1. Table 10 displays
the mean and the standard deviation of the productivity growth between 1986 and 1990.
The average annual growth in productivity is relatively small, below 0.1 percent, for the
majority of the industries and for six of them (Wood and Furniture (7), Pulp and Paper (8),
Chemicals (9), Cement (12), Nonmetal minerals (13), and Iron and Steel (14)) the average
growth rate is negative. The standard deviation, however, is relatively high demonstrating
that there are significant differences among the firms in each industry with respect to
productivity growth performances. The last column of Table 10 shows the percentage of
firms that have moved across the quartiles of the productivity growth distribution. The
figures are always above 60 percent demonstrating that in each industry there is a lot of
heterogeneity and reshuffling across firms. This results can be observed further in Figure
3 where the frequency and the kernel approximated distribution of productivity growth
is depicted for three industries in 1986 (left panel) and 1990 (right panel). It is easy to
see that, even if the distribution is always centered around zero, its shape considerably
changes between the first and the last year in each of the three industries. Furthermore,
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Figure 2: Productivity as a function of capital and investment
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in the Beverage sector the distribution is fairly symmetric although very leptokurtic in
both the first and last year. In the Chemicals sector the distribution is skewed to the
right in 1986 but skewed to the left in 1990 and strongly leptokurtic in both years. In
the Nonelectrical machinery sector the distribution is right skewed and leptokurtic in both
1986 and 1990 but skewness and kurtosis are lower in the last year. In conclusion in none
of the sector the distribution of productivity growth seems normal.
6.3 Robustness checks with alternative models
In this section I compare the production function coefficient estimates obtained apply-
ing the structural approach to alternative models. In particular I estimate the following
additional specifications:
I Value added with translog technology using the investment as a proxy for productivity
(Olley and Pakes method) and estimating all the production function coefficients in
the second stage relying on the moment conditions in (3.15).
II Value added with Cobb-Douglas technology using the demand for intermediate inputs
as a proxy for productivity (Levinson and Petrin method), estimating the coefficient
on labor in the first stage and the coefficient on capital in the second stage relying on
the moment condition in (3.14).
III Value added with translog technology using the Levinson and Petrin method and
estimating all the production function coefficients in the second stage relying on the
moment conditions in (3.15).
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Table 10: Annual productivity growth
% Firms
Industry Mean Std. Dev. moving
1 0.0078 0.2392 73.29
2 0.0048 0.1110 78.57
4 0.0005 0.1082 73.78
5 0.0022 0.2607 74.50
6 0.0042 0.1154 70.75
7 -0.0049 0.2390 72.12
8 -0.0027 0.1285 74.56
9 -0.0039 0.1231 76.46
10 0.0006 0.1212 75.49
11 0.0079 0.3033 85.06
12 -0.0121 0.2199 78.85
13 -0.0001 0.1292 77.17
14 -0.0084 0.1186 67.41
16 0.0004 0.0959 70.93
17 0.0045 0.1164 67.20
18 0.0065 0.2574 80.98
19 0.0002 0.1728 74.89
20 0.0221 0.2660 71.35
Note: The last column reports the percentage of firms
that during the period 1986-1990 have moved across
the quartiles of the productivity growth distribution.
IV Gross output with Cobb-Douglas technology including intermediate inputs in the pro-
duction function, using the Levinson and Petrin method, and relying on the moment
conditions of lagged labor, lagged intermediate inputs, and current capital to identify
the coefficients associated with labor, intermediate inputs, and capital, respectively,
in the second stage.
The results for the second and fourth specifications are omitted here because the esti-
mation of these models was particularly problematic. The solving algorithm could not find
a solution satisfying the optimization criteria and the resulting production function param-
eters were in many cases zero which implies that, since I imposed the restriction for the
βs to be nonnegative, this constraint was often binding. The results for the first and third
specifications are presented in Tables 11, 12, and 13. In particular, I estimate the third
specification twice, first using the entire sample and then using a subsample excluding the
maquiladoras. This is because the Mexican accounting system includes in the books of the
firm that orders a subcontracting service the value of expenditure in intermediate inputs
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Figure 3: Distribution of productivity growth
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(c) Nonelectrical machinery
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used by the subcontractor, generating a measurement error problem with the intermediate
inputs.
The results in Tables 11, 12, and 13 demonstrate, first, that even if the translog specifi-
cation allows for a more flexible way of modeling technology, the overall significance of the
estimates is much lower because the higher order and interaction terms potentially generate
collinearity issues. Moreover, the interpretation of the coefficients and returns to scale is
complicated with translog because the sign and the magnitudes of the coefficients do not
have a straightforward meaning as they capture more elaborated and complex interactions
between inputs.
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Table 11: Estimates of production function coefficients,
translog technology, Olley and Pakes method
Industry βl βk βll βkk βlk
1 -0.5721∗∗ 0.8281∗∗ -0.2091∗∗ 0.1178 -0.0163
2 -0.1930 0.7812∗∗ -0.1736∗∗ 0.0080 0.1688
4 0.2847 0.2217∗∗ -0.0709 0.0658 -0.0519
5 -0.0629 0.4851∗∗ -0.1372 0.0439 0.0179
6 1.1807∗∗ -0.9369∗∗ 0.4271 0.2104∗∗ -0.8233∗∗
7 -0.1161 0.4346 -0.2170 -0.0726 0.1719
8 0.0109 0.4832 -0.1031 0.0496 -0.0376
9 0.0249 0.5997∗∗ -0.0522∗∗ 0.0461 -0.0056
10 0.1905 0.6011∗∗ -0.1205∗∗ 0.0214 0.0960
11 -0.7413 1.1676 -0.3956 -0.1522 0.5748
12 -0.6070 0.9394 0.0396 -0.1361 0.4806
13 0.0622 0.3478∗∗ -0.1197∗∗ 0.0199 0.0065
14 -0.2046 0.7527∗∗ -0.2260 -0.0090 0.2257
16 -0.0524 0.4558∗∗ -0.1157 0.1322 -0.1350
17 0.2323 0.6427 -0.0173 0.0281 -0.0093
18 -0.8505 1.3917∗∗ -0.5748∗∗ -0.1901 0.7524
19 0.3172∗∗ 0.7545∗∗ 0.0107 0.0715 -0.0268
20 -0.6517∗∗ 0.9863∗∗ -0.3648∗∗ -0.0030 0.2928
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05), i.e. zero is not contained
in the 95 percent confidence interval obtained by block-bootstrapping.
The lack of significance is exacerbated when the intermediate inputs demand is used as a
proxy for productivity as confirmed by the results reported in Table 12 and 13. The cause
of this problem is likely to be the measurement error in intermediate inputs, originated
by the peculiar way of recording expenditure in intermediates for the maquiladoras, which
does not appear to be resolved even when these firms are excluded. In fact, a crucial
requirement for the Levinson and Petrin method to be successfully applied is the absence
of measurement error in intermediate inputs expenditure.
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Table 12: Estimates of production function coefficients,
translog technology, Levinson and Petrin method (full sample)
Industry βl βk βll βkk βlk
1 0.1802 0.2095 -0.0513 0.0472 -0.0954
2 0.0427 0.5830∗∗ -0.1206 0.0164 0.0997
4 3.4026 1.2897 0.4224 0.1580 -0.1516
5 -0.0905 0.1157 -0.1374 0.0480 0.0742
6 1.0747 -0.7804 0.3546 0.1824 -0.6245∗∗
7 -0.3855 0.1080 -0.2711 -0.0653 0.2937
8 0.4332 0.2107 0.0085 0.0867 -0.1770
9 0.2912 0.4189 -0.0070 0.0442 -0.0515
10 0.8374 0.0504 0.1267 0.1365 -0.2883
11 0.0808 0.6522 0.0868 0.0135 0.0125
12 -0.6883 1.5939∗∗ 0.4354 -0.2522 0.3858
13 -0.1825 0.0699 -0.1802 0.0058 0.1736
14 0.5714∗∗ 0.2521 -0.0752 0.0166 0.0229
16 0.0089 0.4300 -0.1181 0.1094 -0.1072
17 -0.2529 -0.7824 -0.1235 -0.0594 0.1201
18 -0.0418 0.5842 -0.2297 0.0530 0.1067
19 0.4602∗∗ 0.5693∗∗ 0.0380 0.0830∗∗ -0.0936
20 -0.7006 0.4892 -0.2989 0.0049 0.2461
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05), i.e. zero is not contained
in the 95 percent confidence interval obtained by block-bootstrapping.
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Table 13: Estimates of production function coefficients,
translog technology, Levinson and Petrin method (no maquiladoras)
Industry βl βk βll βkk βlk
1 0.3688 0.0799 0.0246 0.0713 -0.2004
2 0.3015 0.4871∗∗ 0.0186 0.0313 -0.0108
4 1.9368 0.8479 0.2181 0.0842 -0.1069
5 -0.0888 0.0604 -0.1406 0.0232 0.0899
6 1.1008 -1.3294 0.3612 0.0915 -0.6068
7 -0.4666 0.0064 -0.2858 -0.0727 0.2973
8 0.3385 0.2600 -0.0135 0.0961 -0.1688
9 0.2820 0.3859 0.0008 0.0477 -0.0735
10 0.3165 0.5362 -0.0904 0.0070 0.0880
11 -0.5346 0.9487 -0.2968 -0.0829 0.3910
12 0.6469 0.6338 0.0770 -0.0684 0.0222
13 -0.2048 0.0895 -0.1775 0.0130 0.1527
14 0.1499 0.5091∗∗ -0.2016 0.0056 0.1357
16 -4.8433 1.9756 -1.5002 -0.1237 0.7065
17 -0.1554 -0.7857 -0.0907 -0.0421 0.0681
18 -0.0285 0.4356 -0.1706 0.1099 -0.0467
19 0.4329∗∗ 0.5857∗∗ -0.0032 0.0735 -0.0279
20 -0.7159 0.4555 -0.3246 -0.0238 0.3011
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05), i.e. zero is not con-
tained in the 95 percent confidence interval obtained by block-bootstrapping.
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7 Price-Cost Margins Results
In this section I present the results on the industry-level markups estimated with the simple
dual approach outlined in Section 3.3. I then compare these with the plant-level markups
derived by plugging into equation (3.19) the production function parameters previously ob-
tained within the structural framework. Finally, with the results of the markup estimations
in hand, I investigate the relation between price-cost margins and trade openness.
7.1 Industry-level Markups
Table 14 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the year- and industry-specific
markups recovered by estimating (3.25) by OLS. Note that with this procedure it is only
possible to estimate one markup for each industry in each year, therefore the variation
is along the (firm) cross-sectional dimension. The average markup ranges between 0.24
for Chemicals and 2.69 for Cement and in almost all the industries the mean and the
median are different, with the mean being usually higher than the median, implying that
the distribution of the markups is not symmetric. Moreover, the standard deviation is
high indicating that in every industry the markups vary consistently across years. In many
industries the magnitude of the markups is quite unreasonable (significantly lower than
one) and the significance of the estimates is fairly poor. Overall this simple estimation
procedure delivers very imprecise and unreliable results and it does not appear to be a
valid alternative to the structural approach.
7.2 Plant-level Markups
Table 15 summarizes the plant-level markups recovered combining the output elasticity
with respect to labor βˆl, obtained estimating (6.1), i.e. a Cobb-Douglas production function
with the investment as a proxy for productivity, and data on labor expenditure and value
added as described in (3.21). For sixteen out of eighteen industries the average markup
is significantly different than zero and above or very close to one. Once again the mean
is higher than the median implying that the markups distribution is positively skewed in
almost all the industries. This result is confirmed in Figure 4 where the distribution of
the markups for some representative industries is plotted. The same figure shows also that
the distribution of the markups is asymmetric, as expected. This is because markups are
supposed to be bigger than or equal to one as they represent the ratio between price and
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Table 14: Industry-level markup estimates
Industry Mean Med. St.D.
1 1.00 0.47 1.36
2 2.54 1.63 3.82
4 0.99 0.59 1.02
5 0.79 0.80 0.47
6 1.45 1.11 1.37
7 1.50 0.93 1.75
8 1.28 1.26 1.16
9 0.24 0.22 0.31
10 0.89 1.10 0.73
11 2.58 0.77 4.17
12 2.69 1.42 3.53
13 0.90 0.54 1.00
14 0.70 0.48 0.74
16 0.70 0.62 0.72
17 0.92 0.43 1.46
18 0.65 0.37 0.83
19 0.30 0.06 0.50
20 0.73 0.56 0.63
Note: Mean, median, and standard de-
viation of the markups are calculated for
each industry pooling all the years.
marginal cost, therefore their distribution should be truncated around one. The standard
deviation is very high indicating a substantial variation in markups across firms in each
manufacturing sector.
The comparison between the results from Table 14 and those in Table 15 clearly high-
lights that the plant-level markups obtained with the structural approach are usually higher
than the ones estimated at the industry level using the simplified approach. This is be-
cause the industry-level markups are estimated in first differences which usually leads to
a downward bias. At plant level the highest significant markup, 2.20, is estimated for the
Cement industry while the lowest significant markup, 0.82, is estimated form the Chemical
industry and this results is the same at the industry level. Nonetheless, the correlation
between the industry-level average markups and the plant-level average markups is merely
0.10.
Table 16 shows the markups estimated at the plant level using different specification for
the production functions, i.e. the alternative models I and III described before. The plant-
level markups with translog technology are confirmed to be higher than the industry-level
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Table 15: Plant-level markup estimates,
Cobb-Douglas technology
Olley&Pakes
(full sample)
Industry Mean Med. St.D.
1 0.40 0.28 0.55
2 1.61∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 2.17
4 1.04∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.60
5 1.68∗∗ 1.52∗∗ 0.85
6 2.19∗∗ 2.30∗∗ 0.35
7 1.21∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 0.56
8 0.96∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 4.27
9 0.82∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 3.11
10 1.13∗∗ 1.02∗∗ 0.86
11 0.29 0.26 0.21
12 2.20∗∗ 2.21∗∗ 1.12
13 1.25∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 0.65
14 1.13∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 1.04
16 0.93∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.53
17 0.99∗∗ 0.91∗∗ 0.50
18 0.82∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.59
19 1.37∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 2.78
20 1.08∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.57
Note: The stars indicate significance level
(**p < 0.05), i.e. zero is not contained in
the 95 percent confidence interval obtained
by block-bootstrapping.
ones in almost all the sectors under any specification. However, the significance of these
results is much lower than the significance of the plant-level markups obtained with Cobb-
Douglas technology and this is mainly due to the fact that the Cobb-Douglas specification
fits the data better and delivers more precise and reliable estimates of the production
function parameters and, therefore, of the markups as well. Furthermore, I conduct a test
to verify whether the average and median markups are statistically bigger than one. In fact,
since the markup in this context is defined as price over marginal cost, a meaningful markup
should be equal to or above one. For almost all the industries and under any specification
I cannot reject the null hypothesis, meaning that the markups are statistically bigger than
one at a 5 percent significance level. This result, though, needs to be considered cautiously
because the confidence intervals obtained by block-bootstrap used for inference are not
tight.
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Figure 4: Distribution of plant-level markup estimates
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In conclusion, the striking differences between the industry-level and plant-level markup
estimates highlight the following important point. Relaxing the constant markup assump-
tion across firms and allowing for time varying and heterogeneous (among firms) produc-
tivity shocks leads to more precise and substantially higher markups.
7.3 Markups and Trade Liberalization
In this section I rely on the models described in Section 4.2 to analyze the impact of trade
liberalization on the price-cost margins at the industry and plant level.
7.3.1 Industry-Level Analysis
To perform the industry-level analysis I use the results of the markups estimation presented
in Section 7.1 obtained with the simple dual approach and the results obtained with the
structural approach estimating a Cobb-Douglas technology and using investment as a proxy
for productivity. In fact, only these two sets of results are directly comparable since
one of the requirements to estimate (3.25) is for the production function to be linearly
homogeneous and the test on the returns to scale of the Cobb-Douglas production function
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Table 16: Plant-level markup estimates, translog technology
Olley&Pakes Levinson&Petrin Levinson&Petrin
(full sample) (full sample) (no maquiladoras)
Industry Mean Med. St.D. Mean Med. St.D. Mean Med. St.D.
1 2.98 2.07 4.04 3.89 2.99 7.12 3.51∗∗ 2.51 4.84
2 2.37∗∗ 1.63 2.79 2.61 1.87 3.03 1.62 1.22 2.72
4 1.27∗∗ 1.11∗∗ 0.80 4.89∗∗ 4.42∗∗ 3.60 3.16∗∗ 2.71∗∗ 2.50
5 2.17∗∗ 2.20∗∗ 1.20 1.76∗∗ 1.61∗∗ 1.25 2.01∗∗ 1.91∗∗ 1.22
6 2.35∗∗ 1.88∗∗ 3.15 1.84∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 2.25 1.79∗∗ 1.33∗∗ 2.50
7 2.17∗∗ 2.16∗∗ 1.22 1.83∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 2.42 1.87∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 2.50
8 4.90 1.35∗∗ 94.62 0.89 1.52 17.36 0.96 1.43 8.32
9 1.06∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 3.51 1.61 1.03 3.36 1.53 0.91 3.34
10 1.45∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 0.71 1.44 1.34 0.66 1.46 1.33 0.96
11 2.74 1.82 3.78 0.63 0.55 1.74 1.17 0.65 2.01
12 3.10 2.89 3.45 1.26 1.57 5.18 3.31 3.28 1.68
13 2.22∗∗ 2.37 1.17 1.87∗∗ 1.65∗∗ 1.60 1.90∗∗ 1.71∗∗ 1.63
14 2.12 1.60 2.72 3.49∗∗ 2.97∗∗ 3.22 3.11∗∗ 2.57∗∗ 3.68
16 1.24 1.57∗∗ 1.47 1.45 1.62 1.80 1.52 1.47 8.82
17 0.69 0.60 0.45 0.44 0.22 0.89 0.48 0.27 1.13
18 1.85 1.22 3.33 2.53 1.45 8.21 2.43 1.27 7.53
19 1.20 0.75 2.27 1.13 0.97∗∗ 1.90 1.66∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 2.15
20 2.61∗∗ 2.69 2.23 1.48∗∗ 1.22∗∗ 1.81 1.50 1.27 1.95
Note: The stars indicate significance level (**p < 0.05), i.e. zero is not contained in the 95 percent
confidence interval obtained by block-bootstrapping.
in (6.1) confirmed that there is statistically significant evidence of constant returns to scale
most of the industries. Recall that the markups obtained with the simple dual approach
are directly estimated at the industry-level. On the other hand, the price-cost margins
obtained with the structural approach are estimated at the plant level, thus in this part
of the analysis I collapse these results to the annual average markup in each sector. The
other explanatory variables included in (4.1), i.e. Herfindahl index, capital-output ratio and
measures of trade exposure, are constructed by aggregating and averaging across individual
firms in each sector in each year. Models 1 and 2, which include industry-specific dummy
variables, should explain the temporal variation within each industry while models 3 and
4, with only year dummy variables, are supposed to capture the variation between sectors.
Note also that the measures of trade exposure reflect the extent of trade liberalization, i.e. a
decrease in the quota coverage or in the tariff rate implies an increase in trade openness and
foreign competition. Therefore, a positive coefficient associated with these trade indicators
describes a negative effect of the trade reforms on the markups and is expected in the
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presence of import discipline. The regression results are reported separately for each type
of trade liberalization instrument in Tables 17-20.
Tables 17 and 18 report the regression results obtained estimating (4.1) by OLS and
using the industry-level markups recovered with the simple dual approach as a dependent
variable. It is easy to see that, using either the quota coverage or the average tariff rate
as trade indicators, very few coefficients in these regressions are significant and this result
is exacerbated in models 3 and 4 which include only year dummy variables. The lack of
significance is further confirmed by the adjusted R2 which is quite low, although all the
models are globally significant as verified by the F -statistic.
In both cases, with quota and tariff, one of the few significant coefficients is the one
associated with the capital-output ratio in models 1 and 2. The sign of this coefficient is
unexpectedly negative however, since only the temporal variation is picked up in the model
with industry dummy variables, this result may be reflect underutilization of installed
capacity during the recession, which was prevalent for most of the sample period.
As for the measures of trade exposure, the coefficient associated with the tariff rate (Table
17, model 3) is positive and highly significant indicating that the markups tend to be
lower the more the openness to trade. The coefficient on the interaction term between the
trade indicator and the capital-output ratio in model 2 is also consistently significant with
both quota and tariff. Its positive sign is again evidence of trade discipline and suggests
that industries with a higher capital-output ratio are more likely to experience a reduction
in margins as a consequence of trade liberalization. Nonetheless, because of the overall
very low explanatory power, the regression results reported in Tables 16 and 17 cannot be
viewed as strong evidence of an impact of trade on the markups. In addition, these results
confirm that the simple dual approach used to obtain the markups at the industry level is
inadequate since the markup estimates are imprecise, and in many cases insignificant, and
this compromises any further analysis conducted with those estimates.
I now turn to the regressions reported in Tables 19 and 20 whose results are also ob-
tained estimating (4.1) by OLS with the annual average markup in each sector, recovered
from the structural plant-level estimation, as dependent variable. First note that in these
regressions the level of significance is substantially higher, especially when the industry
dummy variables are included (models 1 and 2). Thus, even if aggregated at the industry
level, the markups coming from the structural estimation appear to perform much bet-
ter. However, a substantial part of the explanatory power comes from industry effects as
demonstrated by the R2 which greatly increases from models 3 and 4 to models 1 and 2.
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This outcome possibly reflects sector-specific industrial characteristics, policies, entry bar-
riers or technological differences that are not captured by the other explanatory variables.
The year effects are always negative, with both quota and tariff, in model 1 and 2 and are
also negative in models 3 and 4 for the majority of the years considered. This result may
capture the fact that during the period of analysis the Mexican economy faced difficult
challenges that negatively impacted the profitability of the firms. The industry dummy
variables, when included, are significant in many industries and their sign are consistent
across all the specifications.
When quota is used as a trade indicator, the coefficient on the capital-output ratio has the
expected positive sign in every model and in model 3 and 4 it is also highly significant,
implying that industries with a higher capital share of output have higher price-cost mar-
gins. On the other hand, when tariff is used as a measure of trade exposure, this coefficient
is still positive and significant when industry dummies are left out, but turns negative,
although insignificant, when industry effects are controlled for. The coefficient associated
with the Herfindahl index, when significant (model 3 with both quota and tariff) is positive
confirming a higher rate of profit in more concentrated industries.
The coefficients on quota coverage and tariff rate are both positive and significant in model
3 indicating that price-cost margins decrease as trade protections are removed. In model
1, however, the same coefficients are not significant, suggesting that differences in the level
of protection across sectors seem to be more relevant than variation over time. Adding
interaction terms reveals a more complex picture. The net impact of quota coverage and
tariff rate as well as their interaction with the Herfindahl index and the capital-output
ratio are not significant in explaining the temporal variation (model 2), but the interaction
between quota and Herfindahl index (Table 19, model 4) and the interaction between tariff
and capital-output ratio (Table 20, model 4) are significant. Specifically, the interaction
term for quota coverage and Herfindahl index is positive and significant implying that the
profitability of the most concentrated industries is likely to decrease when trade is liberal-
ized. Conversely, the interaction term for tariff rate and capital-output ratio in negative
and highly significant suggesting that the trade reforms have a negative impact on the
margins of the industry with the lowest capacity.
In summary, the industry-level analysis provides some evidence of import discipline,
i.e. lower protection generated lower profitability in the Mexican manufacturing indus-
tries. This pattern is clearly established across sectors but not equally clearly over time.
Moreover, the importance of using reliable estimates (in this case markups) to correctly
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evaluate economic policies is emphasized by the much better performance of the markups
estimated within the structural framework with respect to the ones estimated relying on
the simpler approach.
7.3.2 Plant-Level Analysis
To examine the intra-sectoral variation in price-cost margins I estimate (4.2) by OLS
using as the dependent variable the plant-level markups. Recall that these markups were
recovered from the structural estimation of my preferred specification, i.e. Cobb-Douglas
technology with investment as a proxy for productivity. The explanatory variables are also
calculated at the plant level with the exception of the trade indicators, quota coverage in
model 1 and average tariff rate in model 2, which are only available at the industry level.
The regression results are reported in Table 21.
First note that the plant-level models are globally significant as indicated by the F -
statistic, but explain only a small fraction of the plant-level variation in price-cost margins
as confirmed by the relatively low value of the adjusted R2 (approximately 1.13). This is
nonetheless a common outcome of regressions performed on large micro-level dataset as the
one used here. The year dummy variables are always negative but insignificant while the
industry dummy variables are significant in many cases with both positive and negative
signs.
The coefficient associated with market share is positive and highly significant suggesting
that a rise in its market share increases the price-cost margin of a plant but at a decreasing
rate since the coefficient on the squared share is, on the other hand, negative and significant.
The coefficient on capital-output ratio is positive and highly significant in both models
implying that, as expected, an increase in capacity has a positive effect on the profitability
of a plant, however this effect becomes marginal when the capacity is large as demonstrated
by the very small magnitude of the coefficient on the squared capital-output ratio.
As for the trade indicators, the coefficients on quota coverage and tariff rate are both
insignificant, implying that there is no evidence that the trade reforms affected the price-
cost margins of the Mexican manufacturing plants. This is not a particularly surprising
result since the high number of firms populating the manufacturing sectors should have
imposed some degree of internal competitive pressure prior to the trade liberalization.
I also estimate the same regressions with the plant-level markups estimated under
different specifications, i.e. translog technology with both investment and intermediate
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inputs demand as proxies for productivity, as dependent variable. The results, not reported
here, are in line with those presented in Table 21. However, the overall significance of
the models is lower presumably because, as already mentioned, the translog production
function specification delivers unreliable markup estimates.
7.4 Markups for exporters
The previous section presented the analysis conducted on markups considering measures
of imports liberalization. In this section, on the other hand, I focus on characterizing the
relation between markups and export status. Moreover, since the structural framework
allows for estimating both markups and productivity at the plant level, I further explore
the role of productivity in the profitability of the Mexican manufacturing plants.
I first estimate (4.3) by OLS using the logarithms of the plant-level markups estimated
using my preferred specification, i.e. Cobb-Douglas technology with investment as a proxy
for productivity, as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are capital and la-
bor use, a full interaction of year and industry dummy variables, and, of course, a dummy
variable indicating export status. After obtaining an estimate for the coefficient associated
with the exporter dummy, ψ1, and the constant term ψ0, I perform a test on the signif-
icance of the nonlinear combination of the parameters ψ1 + exp(ψ0) which captures the
level markup difference for exporters. Finally, I re-estimate (4.3) adding the estimated pro-
ductivity ωjt in order to directly control for differences in productivity and verify whether
there is still evidence of a markup premium for exporter. Specifically, the second regression
is given by: ln(µjt) = ψ0 + ψ1Ejt + ψ2ωjt + zjtρ+ εjt.
In both cases, with and without the additional productivity control, I obtain that
the the level markup difference µE = ψ1 + exp(ψ0) is positive, 0.019 not controlling for
productivity and 0.016 controlling for productivity respectively, but insignificant. However,
since the number of exporting firms in the Mexican manufacturing industries is not very
high in the years considered and, most importantly, the extent of exporting is quite limited
for the majority of the exporters, I try to verify whether the markup premium exists for
intensive exporters, i.e. firms that export a high percentage of the value of their output.
To do so I calculate for each exporter the ratio of exports value over output value and
substitute the export dummy in (4.3) with another dummy, EHjt , that indicates export
intensity. Specifically, EHjt is equal to one if firm j is in the 75th or above percentile of the
export-output ratio distribution, i.e. if firm j is an intensive exporter. Table 22 shows the
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results obtained estimating by OLS the modified version of (4.3) with the export intensity
dummy, not controlling (model 1) and controlling for productivity (model 2).
First the coefficient associated with the export intensity dummy variable is always pos-
itive and significant, with and without including productivity in the regression suggesting
that exporting has a positive impact on price-cost margins. Also the coefficient associated
with productivity in model 2 is positive and highly significant, meaning that productivity
contributes to firms’ profitability. In addition, the level markup difference for intensive
exporters µEH is positive significant in both model. More precisely, I obtain a significantly
estimated µEH of 0.0588 in model 1 which implies that intensive exporters have a level
markup premium of approximately 6 percent. In model 2 the estimated µEH is signif-
icant and equal to 0.0539 meaning that, even controlling for productivity, the intensive
exporter have a level markup premium of approximately 5.4 percent. Note that controlling
for productivity in this context means to control for differences in marginal costs, if ψ2
(the coefficient on productivity) picks up cost heterogeneity fully, so that the coefficient on
the intensive exporter dummy picks up the variation in average prices between intensive
exporter and the other firms (low exporters and non exporters). However, because the
productivity used in this regression was estimated as the residual of a value added pro-
duction function, it may not contain only differences in costs but also unobserved quality
differences in both inputs and output, as well as others market power effects. Nonetheless
it is important to emphasize that an intensive exporter effect is still present even once
differences in productivity are accounted for. This result is therefore consistent with the
recent international trade literature predicting a positive relation between markups and
exports status, especially when intensive exporters are considered.
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Table 17: Regression estimates at the industry level with industry-level markup as the
dependent variable and quota coverage as the trade liberalization indicator
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent
Intercept 1.394 (1.952) 2.791 (2.016) 0.267 (0.626) 0.324 (0.806)
H -11.228 (23.00) -21.935 (23.53) 4.422 (7.586) 5.710 (10.19)
QUOTA -0.460 (1.757) -3.081 (3.106) 1.385 (1.197) 1.331 (2.366)
KQ -0.531 (0.314)∗ -1.608 (0.549)∗∗∗ 0.177 (0.231) 0.016 (0.402)
H*QUOTA 8.967 (41.13) -7.001 (37.36)
KQ*QUOTA 2.847 (1.211)∗∗ 0.531 (1.062)
Year dummy
1985 2.497 (1.143)∗∗ 2.132 (1.168)∗ 1.637 (0.841)∗∗ 1.581 (0.855)∗
1986 -0.606 (0.705) -0.674 (0.691) -0.796 (0.598) -0.773 (0.607)
1987 0.225 (0.610) 0.345 (0.600) 0.009 (0.563) 0.059 (0.578)
1988 0.250 (0.572) 0.217 (0.560) 0.315 (0.547) 0.333 (0.554)
1989 0.068 (0.561) -0.044 (0.552) 0.213 (0.545) 0.219 (0.552)
Industry dummy
1 -0.171 (1.643) -0.416 (1.675)
2 2.294 (1.277)∗ 2.461 (1.277)∗
4 -0.061 (1.347) -0.251 (1.321)
5 0.171 (0.958) 0.365 (0.942)
6 0.742 (0.954) 0.872 (0.937)
7 0.868 (1.075) 1.168 (1.062)
8 0.479 (1.191) 0.555 (1.166)
9 -0.916 (1.566) -1.179 (1.540)
10 0.598 (1.024) 0.376 (1.009)
11 2.244 (0.935)∗∗ 2.707 (0.936)∗∗∗
12 2.875 (1.143)∗∗∗ 3.911 (1.202)∗∗∗
13 0.098 (1.179) 0.219 (1.155)
14 0.603 (1.064) 1.404 (1.095)
16 -0.139 (1.039) -0.164 (1.017)
17 0.464 (1.028) 0.933 (1.026)
18 -0.183 (1.037) -0.154 (1.020)
19 -0.166 (0.977) 0.098 (0.962)
N. of Observations 108 108 108 108
Root MSE 1.573 1.539 1.623 1.638
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.288 0.208 0.194
F -statistic 2.480 2.600 4.510 3.570
Prob> F 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01). Model 1 includes year and industry dummy
variables. Model 1 includes year and industry dummy variables as well as the interactions between quota and
Herfindahl index and quota and capital-output ratio. Model 3 includes only year dummy variables. Model 4
includes year dummy variables and the interactions between quota and Herfindahl index and quota and capital-
output ratio.
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Table 18: Regression estimates at the industry level with industry-level markup as the
dependent variable and average tariff rate as the trade liberalization indicator
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent
Intercept -1.516 (2.041) 1.962 (2.314) -0.884 (0.727) -0.941 (1.280)
H -3.121 (21.78) -30.882 (27.64) 1.989 (7.288) 0.193 (18.63)
TARIFF 14.372 (4.391)∗∗∗ 1.822 (7.155) 8.699 (2.863)∗∗∗ 8.908 (6.504)
KQ -0.464 (0.294) -2.850 (0.859)∗∗∗ 0.342 (0.230) 0.494 (0.623)
H*TARIFF 99.348 (106.5) 9.179 (98.80)
KQ*TARIFF 9.085 (3.128)∗∗∗ -0.665 (2.552)
Year dummy
1985 -0.329 (0.989) -0.557 (0.955) 0.682 (0.771) 0.680 (0.792)
1986 -2.857 (0.870)∗∗∗ -3.023 (0.836)∗∗∗ -1.916 (0.701)∗∗∗ -1.932 (0.715)∗∗∗
1987 -0.727 (0.613) -0.734 (0.589) -0.515 (0.573) -0.530 (0.581)
1988 0.495 (0.543) 0.470 (0.521) 0.409 (0.527) 0.401 (0.534)
1989 0.133 (0.528) -0.052 (0.510) 0.209 (0.525) 0.208 (0.531)
Industry dummy
1 1.070 (1.553) 0.437 (1.515)
2 1.809 (1.084)∗ 2.251 (1.069)∗∗
4 0.249 (1.269) 0.130 (1.247)
5 -0.596 (0.880) -0.454 (0.851)
6 0.005 (0.880) 0.164 (0.846)
7 0.615 (1.010) 0.634 (0.991)
8 1.099 (1.136) 0.988 (1.108)
9 0.373 (1.525) -0.076 (1.480)
10 0.910 (0.968) 0.732 (0.948)
11 1.915 (0.885)∗∗∗ 1.994 (0.849)∗∗
12 4.119 (1.135)∗∗∗ 6.055 (1.265)∗∗∗
13 0.436 (1.113) 0.433 (1.085)
14 1.876 (1.069)∗ 2.994 (1.118)∗∗∗
16 0.548 (0.997) 0.472 (0.974)
17 1.289 (0.999) 1.772 (0.986)∗
18 -0.011 (0.977) 0.091 (0.968)
19 0.489 (0.926) 0.773 (0.899)
N. of Observations 108 108 108 108
Root MSE 1.480 1.420 1.563 1.580
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.208 0.265 0.251
F -statistic 3.220 3.580 5.830 4.580
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01). Model 1 includes year and industry dummy
variables. Model 1 includes year and industry dummy variables as well as the interactions between tariff and Herfind-
ahl index and tariff and capital-output ratio. Model 3 includes only year dummy variables. Model 4 includes year
dummy variables and the interactions between tariff and Herfindahl index and tariff and capital-output ratio.
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Table 19: Regression estimates at the industry level with industry-average markup as the
dependent variable and quota coverage as the trade liberalization indicator
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent
Intercept 1.283 (0.163)∗∗∗ 1.278 (0.175)∗∗∗ 0.593 (0.180)∗∗∗ 0.700 (0.225)∗∗∗
H -2.051 (1.923) -2.044 (2.055) 7.254 (2.173)∗∗∗ 3.667 (2.868)
QUOTA -0.019 (0.147) -0.026 (0.266) 1.076 (0.346)∗∗∗ 0.443 (0.663)
KQ 0.025 (0.026) 0.031 (0.048) 0.164 (0.067)∗∗ 0.295 (0.114)∗∗
H*QUOTA 0.288 (3.459) 18.843 (10.24)∗
KQ*QUOTA -0.015 (0.106) -0.438 (0.298)
Year dummy
1985 -0.119 (0.095) -0.115 (0.100) -0.593 (0.243)∗∗ -0.534 (0.241)∗∗
1986 -0.121 (0.058)∗∗ -0.120 (0.059)∗∗ -0.231 (0.173) -0.269 (0.171)
1987 -0.056 (0.050) -0.057 (0.051) -0.113 (0.163) -0.186 (0.163)
1988 -0.036 (0.048) -0.036 (0.048) 0.022 (0.158) -0.013 (0.156)
1989 -0.057 (0.047) -0.057 (0.047) 0.011 (0.158) -0.013 (0.155)
Industry dummy
1 -0.800 (0.138)∗∗∗ -0.795 (0.144)∗∗∗
2 0.447 (0.106)∗∗∗ 0.448 (0.109)∗∗∗
4 -0.143 (0.112) -0.142 (0.114)
5 0.599 (0.080)∗∗∗ 0.598 (0.082)∗∗∗
6 1.101 (0.080)∗∗∗ 1.102 (0.081)∗∗∗
7 0.070 (0.090) 0.069 (0.092)
8 -0.183 (0.099)∗ -0.183 (0.100)∗
9 -0.381 (0.131)∗∗∗ -0.379 (0.134)∗∗∗
10 -0.012 (0.085) -0.010 (0.087)
11 -0.803 (0.078)∗∗∗ -0.805 (0.081)∗∗∗
12 1.037 (0.095)∗∗∗ 1.032 (0.103)∗∗∗
13 0.081 (0.099) 0.080 (0.100)
14 0.074 (0.089) 0.070 (0.096)
16 -0.202 (0.087)∗∗ -0.202 (0.088)∗∗∗
17 -0.155 (0.086)∗ -0.157 (0.088)∗
18 -0.312 (0.087)∗∗∗ -0.311 (0.088)∗∗∗
19 0.247 (0.081)∗∗∗ 0.246 (0.083)∗∗∗
N. of Observations 108 108 108 108
Root MSE 0.131 0.133 0.470 0.462
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.931 0.147 0.175
F -statistic 60.70 54.85 3.300 3.280
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01). Model 1 includes year and industry dummy
variables as well as the interactions between quota and Herfindahl index and quota and capital-output ratio. Model
3 includes only year dummy variables. Model 4 includes year dummy variables and the interactions between quota
and Herfindahl index and quota and capital-output ratio.
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Table 20: Regression estimates at the industry level with industry-average markup as the
dependent variable and average tariff rate as the trade liberalization indicator
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent
Intercept 1.335 (0.179)∗∗∗ 1.421 (0.217)∗∗∗ 0.448 (0.223)∗∗ -0.144 (0.360)
H -2.194 (1.928) -3.245 (2.595) 6.367 (2.238)∗∗∗ 3.801 (5.109)
TARIFF -0.259 (0.387) -0.624 (0.661) 1.615 (0.883)∗ 4.399 (1.817)∗∗
KQ 0.025 (0.026) -0.019 (0.082) 0.188 (0.071)∗∗∗ 0.914 (0.178)∗∗∗
H*TARIFF 4.860 (9.502) 9.583 (26.67)
KQ*TARIFF 0.160 (0.299) -3.202 (0.733)∗∗∗
Year dummy
1985 -0.083 (0.087) -0.087 (0.089) -0.335 (0.237) -0.376 (0.223)∗
1986 -0.086 (0.077) -0.090 (0.078) -0.275 (0.216) -0.375 (0.201)∗
1987 -0.042 (0.054) -0.043 (0.054) -0.133 (0.177) -0.200 (0.164)
1988 -0.041 (0.048) -0.041 (0.048) 0.050 (0.163) 0.015 (0.151)
1989 -0.058 (0.047) -0.062 (0.047) 0.014 (0.162) 0.013 (0.150)
Industry dummy
1 -0.828 (0.137)∗∗∗ -0.838 (0.141)∗∗∗
2 0.447 (0.095)∗∗∗ 0.460 (0.099)∗∗∗
4 -0.147 (0.112) -0.144 (0.115)
5 0.609 (0.078)∗∗∗ 0.607 (0.080)∗∗∗
6 1.110 (0.078)∗∗∗ 1.113 (0.079)∗∗∗
7 0.074 (0.090) 0.079 (0.092)
8 -0.194 (0.100)∗ -0.191 (0.102)∗
9 -0.405 (0.135)∗∗∗ -0.412 (0.138)∗∗∗
10 -0.018 (0.085) -0.017 (0.088)
11 -0.798 (0.078)∗∗∗ -0.797 (0.079)∗∗∗
12 1.012 (0.100)∗∗∗ 1.052 (0.118)∗∗∗
13 0.075 (0.099) 0.080 (0.101)
14 0.052 (0.095) 0.083 (0.105)
16 -0.213 (0.088)∗∗ -0.211 (0.090)∗∗
17 -0.170 (0.088)∗ -0.156 (0.091)∗
18 -0.315 (0.087)∗∗∗ -0.308 (0.090)∗∗∗
19 0.232 (0.082)∗∗∗ 0.241 (0.083)∗∗∗
N. of Observations 108 108 108 108
Root MSE 0.131 0.132 0.484 0.447
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.932 0.094 0.228
F -statistic 61.04 55.51 2.380 4.160
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01). Model 1 includes year and industry dummy
variables. Model 1 includes year and industry dummy variables as well as the interactions between tariff and
Herfindahl index and tariff and capital-output ratio. Model 3 includes only year dummy variables. Model 4 includes
year dummy variables and the interactions between tariff and Herfindahl index and tariff and capital-output ratio.
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Table 21: Regression estimates at the plant level with plant-level markup as the
dependent variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Independent
Intercept 1.0684 (0.1175)∗∗∗ 1.1154 (0.1485)∗∗∗
SHARE 1.6139 (0.2531)∗∗∗ 1.3719 (0.3773)∗∗∗
SHARE2 -0.2433 (0.1261)∗ -0.2219 (0.1275)∗
KQ 0.1659 (0.0057)∗∗∗ 0.1658 (0.0057)∗∗∗
KQ2 -1.8e−4 (8.3e−6)∗∗∗ -1.8e−4 (8.3e−6)∗∗∗
QUOTA -0.0048 (0.2349)
TARIF -0.2925 (0.5565)
SHARE*QUOTA 0.6111 (0.5275)
SHARE*TARIFF 1.9790 (1.6234)
Year dummy
1985 -0.1134 (0.1370) -0.0654 (0.1126)
1986 -0.1257 (0.0771)∗ -0.0908 (0.1012)
1987 -0.1004 (0.0649) -0.0848 (0.0707)
1988 -0.0603 (0.0617) -0.0614 (0.0619)
1989 -0.0602 (0.0619) -0.0596 (0.0618)
Industry dummy
1 -0.7805 (0.1311)∗∗∗ -0.7909 (0.1254)∗∗∗
2 0.2169 (0.1489) 0.2269 (0.1331)∗
4 -0.1105 (0.1321) -0.1115 (0.1318)
5 0.5857 (0.1432)∗∗∗ 0.5990 (0.1396)∗∗∗
6 1.1255 (0.1833)∗∗∗ 1.1399 (0.1806)∗∗∗
7 0.0333 (0.1454) 0.0415 (0.1460)
8 -0.2394 (0.1295)∗∗ -0.2496 (0.1304)∗∗
9 -0.3969 (0.1189)∗∗∗ -0.4125 (0.1236)∗∗∗
10 -0.0451 (0.1244) -0.0510 (0.1249)
11 -1.1191 (0.1938)∗∗∗ -1.1326 (0.1943)∗∗∗
12 0.6382 (0.1824)∗∗∗ 0.6229 (0.1889)∗∗∗
13 0.0650 (0.1337) 0.0627 (0.1334)
14 -0.2687 (0.1421)∗ -0.2924 (0.1533)∗
16 -0.2190 (0.1316)∗ -0.2299 (0.1327)∗
17 -0.2457 (0.1296)∗ -0.2601 (0.1329)∗∗
18 -0.3643 (0.1309)∗∗∗ -0.3699 (0.1308)∗∗∗
19 -0.0406 (0.1330) -0.0515 (0.1335)
N. of Observations 11205 11205
Root MSE 1.814 1.814
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.127
F -statistic 59.48 59.49
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01). Model
1 includes quota as a trade liberalization indicator. Model 2 includes tariff as
a trade liberalization indicator. 83
Table 22: Markups and export status
Variable Model 1 Model 2
EHjt 0.0216 (0.0082)
∗∗∗ 0.0198 (0.0076)∗∗∗
ωjt 0.3977 (0.0118)
∗∗∗
Linear restriction
ψ1 + exp(ψ0) 0.0588 (0.0222)
∗∗∗ 0.0539 (0.0208)∗∗∗
N. of Observations 7929 7929
Root MSE 0.287 0.268
Adjusted R2 0.871 0.887
F -statistic 590.8 669.4
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
Note: The stars indicate significance levels (***p < 0.01). Model 1 includes
only the export intensity dummy variable and the set of zjt controls. Model
2 includes the export intensity dummy variable, the set of zjt controls as
well as productivity.
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8 Conclusions
In this contribution I focus on the importance of correctly estimating production function
parameters and price-cost margins in order to assess differences in technology, productivity,
and market power among eighteen Mexican manufacturing firms and evaluate the impact
of trade liberalizing policies on their profitability.
Relying on a structural framework that corrects the simultaneity bias using investment
or intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity I estimate production func-
tion parameters. My results confirm the well establish empirical evidence that production
function coefficients obtained with OLS are biased and support the argument that control-
ling for firm-specific productivity shocks successfully corrects this bias. In fact, compared
to OLS, the structural estimation delivers a much lower labor parameter and a higher
capital parameter. I also find evidence of constant returns to scale in the majority of the
industries analyzed.
The second step in my empirical investigation is to use the production function esti-
mates to recover firm-level markups adopting a structural approach in which markups are
derived from cost minimization first order conditions and can be interpreted as the wedge
between the cost share of production factors and their revenue share. I test the validity of
this approach by comparing the firm-level markup estimates with industry-level markups
obtained through a less sophisticated dual estimation approach. The price cost-margins
estimated at the plant level are more reasonable in terms of magnitude and significantly
higher than their industry-level counterparts. This result demonstrates that explicitly tak-
ing into account differences in productivity is crucial in assessing the extent of market
power.
Finally, I exploit the fact that the sample spans over a period of dramatic reforms in the
Mexican economy to quantify the impact of trade exposure on the markups. I conduct an
industry-level as well as a plant-level analysis relating price-cost margins and measures of
import liberalization. The industry-level evidence confirms the hypothesis of import disci-
pline, i.e. the removal of trade protections negatively affected the profitability of domestic
firms, but this evidence is not confirmed in the plant-level analysis. Nonetheless, this is
not a very surprising result since the Mexican manufacturing sector was presumably quite
competitive even prior to the trade policy reforms because of the large number of firms op-
erating in this sector. In addition, I test the prediction of several recent international trade
models that larger firms are likely to be more productive, thus can charge higher markups
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and afford to pay a sunk cost to become exporters. In the case of Mexican exporters I find
a statistically significant markup premium only for ”intensive” exporters, i.e. firms that
export a high percentage of their output, and for these firms the premium prevails even
after netting out the effect of productivity. Furthermore, as expected, productivity proves
to have a positive and highly significant effect on the markups confirming that the most
productive firms have, on average, higher markups.
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